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The Extra-legislative Veto 
MICHAEL SANT' AMBROGIO* 
Presidents check statutory mandates outside the legislative process in a 
variety of ways. They may hold up implementation of a law, decide not to en-
force a law, or decline to defend a law, to name just a few. This Article argues 
that these "extra-legislative vetoes" serve functions similar to the President's 
Article I veto, only with respect to enacted law. The extra-legislative veto 
( 1) requires that legal mandates maintain a threshold level of political support, 
(2) allows the President to protect the people from laws that the President views 
as bad, and ( 3) encourages deliberation regarding controversial policies. But 
the extra-legislative veto also poses dangers to our Madisonian system by virtue 
of the distinct institutional constraints on its exercise. A unilateral check on 
congressional acts threatens to transform the President into a "Legislator in 
Chief' and undermine the stability and transparency of government policy. 
Based on this reconceptualization of the extra-legislative veto, this Article 
reviews some of its most prominent forms. The Article concludes that decisions 
not to defend a statute provide some of the benefits of an extra-legislative veto 
without raising significant concerns with transparency, executive lawmaking, or 
policy destabilization. Enforcement policies provide greater deliberation-
forcing benefits, political responsiveness, and protection from "bad law" but 
also increase executive lawmaking. Although judicial review sets boundaries on 
policy instability, it does little to ensure the transparency of enforcement 
discretion. Conversely, judicial review of rulemaking does a better job promot-
ing the transparency of statutory implementation but limits the extra-legislative 
veto's political responsiveness. Finally, the presidential nonenforcement theory 
advanced by some scholars would dramatically increase the President's power 
to protect the people from unconstitutional laws but would risk greater execu-
tive lawmaking and oscillations in policy, without the same deliberative benefits 
or political responsiveness of other extra-legislative vetoes. Accordingly, this 
Article proposes institutional mechanisms to preserve Congress's voice in inter-
branch policy deliberation while leveraging the extra-legislative veto's power to 
protect the people from "laws gone bad." 
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[W]e've got three branches of government. Congress passes the law. The 
executive branch's job is to enforce and implement those laws. And then the 
judiciary has to interpret the laws .... [F]or me to simply ... ignore those 
congressional mandates would not conform with my appropriate role as 
President. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Each president brings his2 own perspective to the statutory mandates he 
inherits from the political coalitions of the past. Inevitably he will disagree with 
some of their choices. Indeed, presidential candidates often campaign on repeal-
ing unpopular laws. Candidate Barack Obama campaigned in 2008 on repealing 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA);3 candidate 
Mitt Romney campaigned in 2012 on repealing "Obamacare."4 But once in 
office, presidents face a stark reality: they have far more power to prevent the 
I. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Univision Town Hall (Mar. 28, 20ll), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-univision-town-
hall. 
2. This Article uses the male pronoun to refer to the President because to date, they have all been 
men. 
3. Open Letter from Barack Obama to the LGBT Cmty. (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http:// 
www.towleroad.com/2008/02/barack-obama-wr.html. 
4. Ian Gray & Amanda Terkel Mitt Romney's Day One Promises: Immigration Reform, Keystone XL 
Pipeline, Repeal Obamacare, HuFFINGTON PosT (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/ 
16/mitt-romney-day-one-promises_n_1968893.html (same); '/ Will,' He Said: Romney's Campaign 
Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/08/30/us/politics/romney-
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enactment of proposed legislation than to repeal extstmg law. Though the 
Constitution grants the President a limited veto power as part of the legislative 
process,5 it commands the President to "take Care that [enacted] Laws be 
faithfully executed";6 the Founders did not furnish the President with the power 
to annul existing laws without seeking new legislation from Congress.7 
But it can be slow and difficult to repeal laws through the legislative process.8 
The constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment9 as well as 
numerous congressionally created "~eto gates" 10 stand in the way of most sig-
nificant legislation. Procedural innovations such as the filibuster 11 allow a 
minority in one house to block repeals favored by a majority of both houses and 
the President. 12 Thus, enacted law can persist long after it has. lost the support of 
the people and the political branches. 13 Consequently, modem presidents tum to 
what this Article calls the "extra-legislative veto." 14 
The extra-legislative veto comprises a variety of practices used by presidents 
to check or weaken statutory mandates outside the legislative process. It in-
cludes decisions not to enforce the law, decisions not to implement the law, 
and decisions not to defend the law. It may be motivated by the President's 
constitutional views, his policy agenda, or simple electoral politics. 
Consider the following high-profile examples from President Obama's first 
i-will.html (promising to issue executive waivers from Obamacare to all fifty states on the first day of 
his administration). 
5. u.s. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
6. u.s. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
7. By means of the pardon power, however, the Founders did expressly provide the President with a 
check on the application of criminal laws in individual cases. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2 (giving the 
President the power "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States"). 
8. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLAI1VE PRocESs 677-85 (2d ed. 2002). INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 959 (1983) ("The choices ... made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on 
governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable .... "). It took twenty 
years and four presidential administrations, for example, to repeal the Tenure of Office Act, which 
President Andrew Jackson was impeached for ignoring. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance 
of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 865, 969 
(1994). 
9. u.s. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
10. William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, J.L. EcoN. & ORo. 1, 2-6 (Apr. 19, 
20 12), http://O-jleo.oxfordjournals.org.gull.georgetown.edu/content/early/20 12/04/ 19/jleo.ews009 .full. 
pdf+html. McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 57 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 3, 16-18 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent]; McNoll-
gast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 
720-21 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons]. 
11. Ezra Klein, The History of the Filibuster, in One Graph, WASH. PosT (May 15, 2012), http:// 
www. washingtonpost.comlblogs/wonkblog/post/the-history-of-the-filibuster-in-one-graph/20 12/05/15/ 
giQAVHfORU_blog.html. 
12. The repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell was repeatedly blocked by a minority in the Senate despite 
the support for repeal by both the President and the House. See, e.g., Steve Benen, Senate GOP Blocks 
DADT Repeal, Military Spending, WASH. MoNTHLY (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ 
archives/individual/20 1 0_09/025773.php. 
13. See infra Part II. 
14. I analogized prolonged agency foot-dragging to an extra-legislative veto in Michael D. 
Sant' Ambrogio, Agency Delays, 79 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1381, 1396-97 (2011). 
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term: 
• In February 2011, President Obama instructed the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) to abandon its defense of DOMA against legal challenges be-
cause the President believed the Act was unconstitutional. 15 
• In September 2011, President Obama blocked a National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard for ground ozone that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) concluded was required by the Clean Air Act, citing the 
need to reduce regulatory burdens during a weak economic recovery. 16 
• In June 2012, President Obama announced the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, directing the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) to suspend deportations under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of a then-estimated 800,000 undocumented immigrants 
who came to the United States as children. 17 
The extra-legislative veto is by no means confined to the Obama Administra-
tion or to Democratic presidents. Republican presidents also make avid use of 
it. 18 President George W. Bush, for example, blocked the EPA's regulation of 
greenhouse-gas emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act, 19 
and the Bush DOJ did not file a single lawsuit alleging a pattern or practice of 
discrimination against African Americans during his first term. 20 
The extra-legislative veto raises difficult questions for our Madisonian system 
of separation of powers and the rule of law. Once legislation has run the 
gauntlet of bicameralism and presentment, it is the law of the land.Z1 As Justice 
Robert H. Jackson famously explained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, "[ w ]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.'m Indeed, before 
reversing course, President Obama defended DHS's deportations under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act by citing his constitutional duty to enforce the 
laws that Congress passed. 23 
Scholars have debated the constitutionality and wisdom of various forms of 
15. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
18. Professor May's exhaustive survey of presidential administrations found that between 1900 and 
1992, five Republican presidents and four Democratic presidents had refused to comply with a law they 
alleged was unconstitutional, the strongest form of an extra-legislative veto. May, supra note 8, at 
998-99. 
19. See infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. 
20. CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CiVIL RIGHTS & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING 
CiVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BusH ADMINISTRATION 29 (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/pdf/civil_rights_report. pdf. 
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. II,§ 3. 
22. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
23. See Obama, supra note I. 
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the extra-legislative veto.Z4 Yet they have not considered more generally the 
functions that an executive check on existing law might serve in our Madiso-
nian system. This Article seeks to fill this gap by developing an analytical 
framework for assessing the normative desirability of an executive check on 
enacted law. It asks: What functions might an executive check on enacted law 
serve? What risks does it pose? How might we design institutional structures to 
harness the extra-legislative veto's potential benefits while minimizing its risks? 
This Article argues that the extra-legislative veto is best understood as 
serving many of the same functions as the veto power the Framers gave the 
President in Article I of the Constitution,25 only with respect to existing law. 
These functional similarities illuminate the potential normative benefits of an 
extra-legislative veto. The Founders gave the President a limited veto power as 
part of the legislative process (1) to provide the Executive with a shield against 
encroachments by the Legislature, (2) to protect the people from laws the 
President views as bad, and (3) to encourage greater deliberation on important 
government policies.26 The constitutional veto accomplishes these goals by 
requiring the President's approval or-if the President objects-two rounds of 
24. Most of this debate has focused on the President's enforcement obligations under the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Daniel J. Crooks III, In Defense of the Obama Administrations Non-Defense of DOMA, 
4 LEGIS. & PoL'Y BRIEF 33, 61 (2012) (arguing that the Obama Administration's decision not to defend 
DOMA was proper); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administrations 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEx. L. REv. 781, 
784-85 (2013) (arguing that Obama's DACA program is unconstitutional); Neal Devins & Saikrishna 
Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 CoLUM. L. REv. 507, 509 (2012) (arguing that the 
President has no duty to defend or enforce laws he deems unconstitutional); Brianne J. Gorod, 
Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1201, 1238-44 
(2012) ("[T]here are arguments that the Executive can-and even should--decline to enforce laws that 
it deems unconstitutional."); Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) 'Unconstitutional' Laws, 
98 VA. L. REv. 1001, 1088 (2012) ("[T)here is a case for thinking that enforcement-litigation gaps 
should be presumptively favored when there is an Article II issue in play, and presumptively disfavored 
for other sorts of constitutional questions."); Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of 
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 7, 10 (2000) (proposing a context-
dependent approach to presidential nonenforcement decisions); Dawn E. Johnsen, The Obama Admin-
istrations Decision to Defend Constitutional Equality Rather than the Defense of Marriage Act, 
81 FORDHAM L. REv. 599, 605 (2012) ("Routine unilateral presidential nonenforcement would under-
mine Congress's core power and constitutionally preferred mechanisms for Presidents to promote their 
constitutional views."); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IowA L. REv. 1267, 1303-04 (1996) (arguing that the President should refuse to 
enforce statutes he believes are unconstitutional); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in 
Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEo. L.J. 
373, 379 (1994) ("I think it is deeply paradoxical to argue that the President is under a duty to enforce 
what he or she believes to be an unconstitutional statute."); May, supra note 8, at 986-88 (arguing that 
presidential noncompliance with allegedly unconstitutional laws is generally improper); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DuKE L.J. 1183, 1202-05 (2012) (arguing that the 
Executive should generally defend congressional statutes); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Danger-
ous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) ("The President's 
power to interpret the law is, within the sphere of his powers, precisely coordinate and coequal in 
authority to the Supreme Court's"). 
25. U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 7. 
26. See infra section II.A. 
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congressional deliberation and a supermajority of each house to enact new 
law.Z7 
But once the constitutional defenses against the enactment of bad law are 
breached, these same defenses, along with subsequent congressional procedural 
innovations, make it exceedingly difficult to repeal bad laws, even when they 
have lost popular support and could not be reenacted. The extra-legislative veto 
is the Executive's response to this structural dilemma, allowing the President to 
check statutory policies that have lost public and political support. In this way, 
the extra-legislative veto (1) protects the sitting President from the choices of 
prior enacting coalitions, (2) rescues the people from "laws gone bad" (that is, 
laws that have unintended consequences or have come to be seen as odious), 
and (3) encourages deliberation concerning contested government policies. 
At the same time, the distinct institutional constraints on the extra-legislative 
veto reveal both its limits and its risks. An executive check on statutory 
mandates threatens to displace Congress with a "Legislator in Chief," who uni-
laterally alters "legal rights, duties, and relations"28 and upsets legislative bar-
gains. In addition, unilateral executive action outside the constitutionally pre-
scribed lawmaking process may undermine the transparency of changes in 
government policy, creating opportunities for "stealth repeals" to {)lease special 
interests, rather than exploiting the President's unique national perspective. 
Moreover, the extra-legislative veto may destabilize the continuity of policies 
and programs dependent upon the grace of each new presidential administra-
tion. In a highly partisan political environment, it also inevitably raises ques-
tions about the legitimacy and legality of the President's actions. 
Accordingly, the normative desirability of extra-legislative vetoes and their 
institutional constraints is a function of their ability to facilitate the benefits of 
an executive veto while enhancing the transparency of changes in policy, 
preserving Congress's supremacy in lawmaking, and avoiding excessive policy 
destabilization. 
Reconceptualizing the extra-legislative veto in this way has important implica-
tions for several current debates in administrative and constitutional law. First, it 
suggests we should fear neither executive decisions not to defend a statute nor 
the exercise of enforcement discretion. Decisions not to defend a statute allow 
the President to respond to political and social change, weaken what he views as 
bad laws, and invite deliberation of controversial policies, without the danger of 
executive lawmaking or destabilization of government policy. Enforcement 
discretion, so long as it is transparent, provides even more potential benefits. 
Though it also entails greater executive lawmaking and policy fluctuations, 
judicial review keeps these in check and provides Congress with a means of 
responding to the Executive's veto. Thus, rather than reducing the Executive's 
enforcement discretion, we should focus on improving its transparency. 
27. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 7. 
28. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,952 (1983) (defining legislative power). 
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The institution in the best position to improve the use of enforcement 
discretion is of course the Executive itself. Therefore, this Article advocates 
executive precommitment to certain "best practices" designed to ensure the 
transparency and deliberation-forcing benefits of the extra-legislative veto. For 
example, agencies should submit proposed enforcement policies to the White 
House and Congress in advance of their implementation to avoid stealth repeals, 
lower congressional monitoring costs, and give Congress the opportunity to 
deliberate changes in government policy ex ante. In addition, formal nonen-
forcement policies should be time limited, periodically reviewed, and open to 
public comment. Consequently, enforcement discretion would not only em-
power the Executive but also would enhance the quality of congressional and 
public deliberation over further legislative action. In this way, the Article 
contributes to the literature advocating "internal checks and balances" within 
the Executive Branch in light of the shift in locus of lawmaking away from 
Congress. 29 
Second, the framework developed herein provides additional support for the 
Supreme Court's recent decision to grant agencies Chevron deference for 
interpretations of their statutory jurisdiction, or jurisdictional discretion?0 Allow-
ing the Executive to expand and contract jurisdiction where congressional intent 
is vague permits some of the functional benefits of the extra-legislative veto 
and will generally be transparent. Moreover, judicial review limits the scope of 
executive lawmaking and policy oscillation. 
Third, analogizing to the Article I veto suggests that the provocative presiden-
tial nonenforcement theory recently advanced by Professors Robert Delahunty, 
Neal Devins, Saikrishna Prakash, John Yoo, and others31 is both too strong and 
too weak. These scholars contend that the President should not enforce any law 
he deems unconstitutional and should only abide by judicial conclusions to the 
contrary in individual cases?2 Such an extra-legislative veto is too strong 
because it allows the President to use his constitutional vision to rewrite laws he 
finds objectionable without any direct congressional check. But it is also too 
weak because an extra-legislative veto, like the Article I veto power, is useful 
29. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative 
Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REv. 201,246 (2007); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today 's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2232 (2006); Anne Joseph O'Connell, 
The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 
CALIF. L. REv. 1655, 1721 (2006). 
30. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) (holding that a court should apply 
Chevron to review an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction). 
31. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 785; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 509. Although 
these scholars have reinvigorated and developed the argument that presidents should not enforce laws 
they believe are unconstitutional, the basic idea has been around for some time. See, e.g., Lawson & 
Moore, supra note 24, at 1303-04; Levinson, supra note 24, at 378-79; Paulsen, supra note 24, at 221. 
Indeed, President Andrew Johnson was impeached in 1868 for ignoring the Tenure of Office Act, which 
he believed unconstitutionally interfered with his removal power. See generally MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, 
THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973). 
32. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 836 n.363; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 574. 
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outside the constitutional sphere. Thus, nonenforcement would not reach all bad 
laws nor facilitate interbranch deliberation over controversial policies-a core 
function of the extra-legislative veto. Rather, presidential nonenforcement creates 
a dialogue between the Executive and the Judiciary in which Congress is a mere 
bystander. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the most common ways in 
which presidents exercise extra-legislative vetoes, focusing on several high-
profile examples from the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations. Part II 
analyzes the normative desirability of an extra-legislative-veto power, including 
its risks and benefits. Part III then reframes the Supreme Court's review of 
extra-legislative vetoes in light of these insights. Next, Part IV uses the frame-
work developed in Part II to propose mechanisms to increase the benefits of 
discrete forms of the extra-legislative veto while mitigating their risks. Finally, 
Part V explores the implications of this Article's reconceptualization of the 
extra-legislative veto for the presidential nonenforcement theory. 
I. EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETOES 
The President plays a significant role in the enactment of new legislation. The 
Constitution charges him with recommending to Congress "such Measures as 
he shall judge necessary and expedient"33 and requires that all bills passed by 
Congress be presented to the President before becoming law.34 The President 
may within ten days (Sundays excepted) return the bill along with his objections 
to the house of Congress in which it originated. 35 This is the "regular" veto, and 
it is subject to a congressional override if two-thirds of each house votes to 
approve the bill after reconsideration.36 Alternatively, if Congress adjourns 
during the ten day period, the President may exercise a "pocket" veto by doing 
nothing?7 The pocket veto is not subject to a congressional override and the bill 
must be reintroduced in Congress. 38 The veto provides the President with a 
formal, albeit limited, check on legislation. In addition, the mere threat of a veto 
may encourage Congress to modify legislation before it reaches the President's 
desk.39 
33. u.s. CONST. art. II,§ 3. 
34. u.s. CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2. 
35. ld. 
36. ld. 
37. ld. If the President does not return the bill to Congress within ten days and Congress does not 
adjourn, the bill becomes law as if the President had signed it. /d. 
38. Robert J. Spitzer, The "Protective Return" Pocket Veto: Presidential Aggrandizement of Constitu-
tional Power, 311'REsiDENTIAL STUD. Q. 720, 721 (2001). 
39. CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PREsiDENTS AND THE POLmcs OF NEG!JIVE POWER 188 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (finding that veto threats produced congressional concessions 90% of the 
time based on a random sampling of initially passed, nonminor bills presented to the President between 
1945 and 1992); ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO: TOUCHSTONE OF THE AMERICAN PREsiDENCY 
101-03 (1988) (reviewing the effects of veto threats). Spitzer found that of fifty-six bills subject to 
public veto threats between 1961 and 1986, thirteen died in Congress and sixteen were modified before 
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The veto is a powerful yet blunt weapon. The President must reject or 
approve the legislation presented to him in whole.40 This creates difficult 
choices because Congress has a habit of combining unrelated legislation in a 
single bill, and the President may like some parts of the bill but not others.41 
One way presidents have tried to mitigate this difficulty is by issuing signing 
statements claiming the authority or intent to disregard objectionable provisions 
contained in legislation that the President otherwise feels compelled to sign.42 
But signing statements are controversial and do not provide any independent 
authority for the President to disregard the laws he signs.43 
In contrast to the President's power to shape and block new legislation, the 
President has no formal constitutional power to annul existing legislation.44 
To the contrary, the Constitution commands the President to "take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed."45 Yet presidents may strongly oppose certain 
statutory mandates, and presidential candidates frequently campaign against 
objectionable laws. In 2008, candidate Barack Obama promised to repeal 
DOMA and DADT.46 In 2012, candidate Mitt Romney promised to dismantle 
the Affordable Care Act, commonly known as "Obamacare."47 Indeed, as the 
rise in signing statements suggests,48 presidents may even oppose aspects of 
legislation they sign into law. 
The President can of course attempt to repeal or amend objectionable laws 
through new legislative efforts. But this will often prove difficult. Bicameralism 
passage to accommodate the President. SPITZER, supra, at 103 tbl.3-4. In three cases, the President 
backed down and the bill was enacted unchanged. /d. In only five cases was the bill passed without 
change and Congress was able to override the President's veto. /d. 
40. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 ( 1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act 
violated the Presentment Clause in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution). 
41. See, e.g., Tim Weiner, Unrelated Spending Divides Conferees on Emergency Bills, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 12, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/12/us/unrelated-spending-divides-conferees-on-
emergency-bills.html. 
42. See, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to Bernard N. Nuss-
baum, Counsel to the President, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements (Nov. 3, 
1993), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/signing.htm. A list of presidential signing statements and 
their texts is maintained by Joyce Green, List of Laws Subjected to Signing Statements, PRESIDENTIAL 
SIGNING STATEMENTS, http://www.coherentbabble.com/listLAWSall.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). Of 
course, the difficulty of vetoing legislation is another reason presidents tum to the extra-legislative veto. 
43. The dramatic increase in signing statements by President George W. Bush, see Charlie Savage, 
Obama Looks to Limit Impact of Tactic Bush Used to Sidestep New Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, 
at Al2, ultimately led the American Bar Association to denounce their use to disregard parts of a law 
the President signs, see ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARXIlON OF 
PoWERS DOCTRINE, REPORT AND REcoMMENDXIlON (2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
damlaba/migratedlleadership/2006/annualldailyjoumal/20060823144113.authcheckdam.pdf. Signing state-
ments have yet to receive the Court's blessing, and President Obama has issued far fewer of them than 
his predecessor. See Green, supra note 42. 
44. However, the President has the power "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the 
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." U.S. CaNST. art. 0, § 2. 
45. U.S. CaNsT. art. II, § 3. 
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
47. See supra note 4. 
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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and presentment, along with numerous congressional veto gates, make repeal 
far from certain, even for laws that have lost popular support and could never be 
reenacted.49 Moreover, presidents have a finite amount of time to devote to a 
seemingly infinite number of matters under their supervision and must focus 
their attention on their most important priorities. 50 There is little doubt that a 
President Romney would have attempted to repeal Obamacare; it is less certain 
whether he would have aggressively sought to repeal the Davis-Bacon Act, 
another campaign commitment.51 Moreover, as the President spends political 
capital pushing his most important priorities through Congress, there may be lit-
tle left to spend on other campaign promises.52 Consequently, presidents block 
statutory mandates contrary to their agenda using the extra-legislative veto. 
The extra-legislative veto is an action taken outside the legislative process 
with the goal of checking, weakening, or curbing a statutory mandate. The 
extra-legislative veto comes in a variety of forms and strengths. The President 
can exercise an extra-legislative veto by not defending a law when its constitu-
tionality is challenged in court;53 by not enforcing a law,54 either in whole or 
in part;55 by not engaging in rulemaking necessary to implement a law;56 by 
withholding funds for a statutory goal;57 by waiving a regulatory requirement;58 
by interpreting a law narrowly to limit its jurisdiction;59 or by plain, old 
foot-dragging.60 The President's veto may be motivated by constitutional prin-
ciples,61 policy preferences,62 or simple electoral politics.63 
This Part illustrates a few of the most important means by which presidents 
49. See infra section li.B.l. 
50. Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, The Politics of Presidential Agendas, 58 PoL. REs. Q. 257, 266 (2005). 
51. See Mitt Romney's Day One Promises, supra note 4. The Davis-Bacon Act requires that 
contractors and subcontractors on federal construction projects pay qualified employees the prevailing 
wage rate for their job classification as determined by the Secretary of Labor. 40 U.S.C. § 3142(b) 
(2006). 
52. For discussion of DADT and DOMA, see infra section I.A. 
53. See infra section I.A. 
54. See infra section I. C. 
55. See infra sections LA-B. 
56. See infra section I. C. 
57. For example, after campaigning in 2008 to shut down Yucca Mountain as a site for storing 
nuclear waste, President Obama's first budget proposed that Department of Energy spending on Yucca 
Mountain "be scaled back to those costs necessary to answer inquiries from the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, while the Administration devises a new strategy toward nuclear waste disposal." OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEw ERA OF REsPONSmiLITY 63, 65 (2009), available at http://www. whitehouse. 
gov/sites/defaultlfiles/omb/assets/fy20 1 O_new _era/ A_ New _Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf; see Keith Rog-
ers, Yucca Critic Wants Clarity, LAs VEGAS REv.-J. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.lvrj.com/news/yucca-
critic-wants-clarity. For an insightful analysis of the conflict between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and the Department of Energy in the Yucca Mountain saga, see Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential 
Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DuKE L.J. 1763, 1782-90 (2012). 
58. See, e.g., Rebecca Berg, Shift in Welfare Policy Draws G.O.P. Protests, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2012, atA17. 
59. See infra section I.C. 
60. See Sant' Ambrogio, supra note 14, at 1396-97. 
61. For discussion ofDOMA, see infra section I.A. 
62. For discussion of the DACA program, see infra section I. B. 
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exercise an extra-legislative veto using examples from recent presidential admin-
istrations. Rather than seeking to present an exhaustive survey, the objective is 
to provide a foundation to assess the potential benefits and risks of a presidential 
veto of enacted law. 
A. DECLINING TO DEFEND A LAW: THE CASE OF DOMA 
President Obama campaigned in 2008 on repealing the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA).64 Enacted in 1996, DOMA (1) declared that no state is required 
to recognize any public acts concerning same-sex marriages recognized by 
another state and (2) defined "marriage" for purposes of federal law as "a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife."65 The national 
debate over same-sex marriage began in 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme Court 
held that the Equal Protection Clause of Hawaii's Constitution required the state 
to demonstrate that its ban on same-sex marriage was narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling state interest.66 After the court remanded the case to the 
trial court, some asserted that the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit 
Clause would require all states to recognize same-sex marriages if they became 
legal in Hawaii.67 The issue became highly politicized as the 1996 presidential 
election approached.68 The legislation was introduced in Congress in May 1996, 
passed by overwhelming majorities of both parties in September, and promptly 
signed into law by President Bill Clinton.69 
Public opinion shifted dramatically in the years following the passage of 
DOMA, however. In 1996, according to a Gallup poll, only 27% of Americans 
supported same-sex marriage.70 By 2010, according to the same Gallup poll, the 
percentage had risen to 44%.71 Moreover, a CNN poll conducted in 2010 found 
for the first time that a narrow majority of Americans supported same-sex 
63. For discussion of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ground ozone, see infra 
section I.C. 
64. See Open Letter from Barack Obama to the LGBT Community, supra note 3. 
65. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 2-3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
66. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67, 74 (Haw. 1993); see also David L. Chambers, Couples: 
Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Pannership, in CREXI'JNG CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PuBLIC PoLICY, AND 
CiviL RIGHTS 281, 291-92 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2000). 
67. Jane S. Schacter, Couns and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation, Then and 
Now, 82 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1153, 1203 (2009). 
68. /d. at 1186. 
69. For a historical account of DOMA and subsequent developments concerning marriage equality 
in Hawaii and the nation, see Michael D. Sant' Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the 
Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAw. L. REv. 705, 721-22 (2011). The House approved the bill 
342 to 67; the Senate approved it 85 to 14./d. at 722 n.l45. 
70. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Opposition to Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, GALLUP (May 24, 
201 0), http://www.gallup.com/po1VI28291/americans-opposition-gay-marriage-eases-slightly.aspx. 
71. /d. 
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marriage.72 When President Obama was elected in 2008, a majority in just three 
states supported marriage equality; by 2011, a majority in eleven states did.73 
Nevertheless, President Obama's commitment to repealing DOMA took a 
back seat during his first year in office to higher legislative priorities, including 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the stimulus)74 and the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as Obama-
care).75 Then a strategic decision was made to first seek repeal of the military's 
Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) policy,76 another campaign commitment,77 
because DADT was perceived to have less support than DOMA.78 DADT was 
ultimately repealed on December 21, 2010, during the lame-duck session of the 
111th Congress.79 But soon thereafter, the House passed to Republican control, 
making repeal of DOMA through the legislative process a nonstarter. 
Two months later, on February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder an-
nounced that he and President Obama had concluded that DOMA was unconsti-
tutional and therefore the DOJ would no longer defend the law against constitu-
tional challenges. 80 The Obama DOJ had initially defended the law, despite 
strong opposition from many of President Obama's constituents.81 But by 2011, 
this position had become untenable.82 The Obama DOJ's defense of DOMA 
was driving a wedge between the President and an important Democratic 
constituency that favored marriage equality. 83 
72. Americans Split Evenly on Gay Marriage, CNN (Aug. 11, 2010), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn. 
com/20 1 0/08/11/americans-split -evenly-on-gay-marriage/. 
73. /d. 
74. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
75. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 
U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). But see Proclamation No. 8529, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,079 (June 
7, 2010) (proclaiming June 2010 as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans gender Pride Month). 
76. DADT was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)), repealed by Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell Repea1Actof2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
77. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
78. Angie Drobnic Holan, Repeal of DOMA Appears Unlikely with Republican Majority in the 
House, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/ 
promise/2 94/ support-repeal-of -the-defense-of-marriage-act. 
79. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell,' N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html?_r= 1&. 
80. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1; Letter from the Attorney Gen. to Cong. on Litig. Involving the 
Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from the Attorney General], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 11/February/11-ag-223.html. 
81. There is a long tradition of the DOJ defending congressional statutes unless they intrude upon 
the President's constitutional powers. See Meltzer, supra note 24, at 1202-05 (calling it "extraordinarily 
unusual for the [DOJ], outside of the separation-of-powers area, not to present colorable arguments in 
defense of a federal statute"). Indeed, presidential nominees to positions in the DOJ are often asked if 
they will defend acts of Congress during their Senate confirmation hearings. /d. at 1218-19 & 
nn.l56-57. 
82. Charlie Savage, Suits on Same-Sex Marriage May Force Administration to Take a Stand, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,2011, atA14. 
83. See id. 
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Of course, Attorney General Holder did not cite the changing mood of the 
country or the President's constituency in explaining the decision to no longer 
defend the law. Rather, he cited a change in the legal landscape. Specifically, the 
Attorney General explained that new lawsuits challenging DOMA had been 
filed in the Second Circuit, where the standard of review for classifications 
based on sexual orientation remained a question of first impression. 84 The 
Attorney General concluded that the Second Circuit would likely hold that gays 
and lesbians constitute a suspect class, triggering the application of heightened 
scrutiny. 85 Consequently, the DOJ could no longer defend DOMA using hypo-
thetical rationales that might satisfy rational basis review but .had to defend 
Congress's actual motivations for the law as "substantially related to an impor-
tant government objective."86 This, Attorney General Holder concluded, the 
DOJ could not do because of the numerous expressions in the congressional 
record of moral disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate relation-
ships.87 He explained that this was "precisely the kind of stereotype-based 
thinking and animus [that] the Equal Protection Clause [was] designed to guard 
against."88 
Although the Obama Administration declined to defend DOMA based on its 
view that the law was unconstitutional, the Administration vowed to continue to 
enforce the law until repealed or enjoined by court order. 89 Meanwhile, the 
House of Representatives quickly stepped in to defend DOMA.90 Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court held that Section 3 of DOMA, which precluded federal 
recognition of same-sex marriages recognized by the states, was unconstitu-
tional.91 
President Obama's decision not to defend DOMA reinvigorated a debate 
about whether it is appropriate for the DOJ to abandon the defense of a duly 
enacted federal statute.92 But scholars seem to agree that, appropriate or not, 
84. Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 80. On October 18, 2012, in an opinion written by 
Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, a George H.W. Bush appointee, the Second Circuit held that intermediate 
scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual orientation. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 
185 (2d Cir. 2012). Thus, in retrospect, the criticism that Attorney General Holder's constitutional 
analysis was mere window dressing, see infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text, seems misplaced. 
85. Letter from the Attorney General, supra note 80. 
86. /d. (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988)). 
87. /d. 
88. /d. 
89. /d. However, in September 2012, the Department of Homeland Security announced that undocu-
mented immigrants without criminal records who are same-sex partners of American citizens are 
eligible to have their deportations halted based on "family relationships." Julia Preston, Same-Sex 
Couples Granted Protection in Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A15. 
90. Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans Move to Uphold Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
2011, at A16. 
91. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013). 
92. Compare Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 509 (arguing that the President has no duty to 
defend or enforce laws he deems unconstitutional), and Crooks, supra note 24, at 61 (arguing that the 
Obama Administration's nondefense of DOMA is proper), with Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab 
in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, VoLOKH CoNSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/02/ 
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statutes are weakened when the DOJ abandons their defense. Professor Orin 
Kerr suggests that the adoption of a contested constitutional theory by the 
Executive Branch constitutes a "power grab" at the expense of Congress93 : 
"[T]he Executive Branch essentially has the power to decide what legislation it 
will defend based on whatever views of the Constitution are popular or associ-
ated with that Administration."94 Consequently, presidential administrations will 
simply decline to defend whatever laws they do not like, and undefended laws 
will be less likely to survive judicial review.95 Similarly, Professor Daniel 
Meltzer argues that from an institutional perspective, the Executive Branch 
generally should defend duly enacted laws of Congress.96 Professor Meltzer 
suggests that Congress may not be well equipped to defend its laws, at least 
outside the context of Supreme Court review.97 Whether Congress even steps in 
depends upon the politics of each house.98 Moreover, without the defense of a 
statute at the trial level, the defenders may not be able to develop the record 
necessary for strong appellate review. 99 The concern of Kerr and Meltzer is that 
undefended statutes are more likely to be struck down as unconstitutional by the 
courts. 
Professors Robert Delahunty, Neal Devins, Saikrishna Prakash, and John 
Yoo, on the other hand, argue that there is no constitutionally based duty for the 
President to defend statutes he believes are unconstitutional. 100 Quite the oppo-
site: they contend that the President's oath to uphold the Constitution compels 
him to neither defend nor enforce laws that he believes are unconstitutional, 
although they admit that the President must execute judicial judgments concern-
ing the constitutionality of a statute in the particular case under review. 101 The 
duty to defend, Devins and Prakash argue, is nothing more than a tool used by 
the DOJ to enhance its independence and status vis-a-vis Congress and the 
courts. 102 Unlike Kerr and Meltzer, Devins and Prakash believe that presidents 
are unlikely to abandon many statutes because they have a "limited constitu-
tional agenda." 103 They calculate that from December 1975 to May 2011, the 
23/the-executive-power-grab-in-the-decision-not-to-defend-DOMA (questioning the nondefense of en-
acted law), and Meltzer, supra note 24, at 1202-05 (arguing that the Executive generally should defend 
congressional statutes). 
93. Kerr, supra note 92. 
94. /d. 
95. /d. 
96. Meltzer, supra note 24, at 1208-27. 
97. /d. at 1209-11. 
98. /d. at 1211-12. 
99. /d. at 1209-11. 
100. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 801; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 532. 
101. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 801; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 532; see 
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executives Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEo. L.J. 
1613, 1627-28 (2008). 
102. Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 540-41. 
103. /d. at 573. 
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DOJ decided not to defend seventy-seven statutory provisions. 104 Moreover, 
there are so many exceptions to the duty to defend that the President can already 
choose not to defend a statute when it suits him. 105 The current state of affairs 
merely obscures the President's constitutional vision. 106 
Though the debate raises unresolved empirical questions about how often the 
President would choose not to defend congressional statutes if unconstrained by 
tradition, fear of congressional reprisal, and questions about its constitutionality, 
there is no question that such decisions do undermine the statutes abandoned by 
the President. First, most would-be defenders lack the resources and expertise of 
the DOJ. 107 Of course, in the case of DOMA, the House was able to hire Paul 
Clement, the Solicitor General during George W. Bush's second term in of-
fice. 108 Mr. Clement has some of the same institutional advantages-familiarity 
and experience with the Court-that distinguishes the DOJ from most private 
attorneys. But this comes at a price. Mr. Clement's defense of DOMA report-
edly cost the government $2.3 million. 109 Perhaps funds can be raised for a few 
high-profile defenses. But what if Congress had to defend scores of federal 
statutes? It would be politically and financially untenable for Congress to hire 
many Paul Clements, particularly to defend statutes such as DOMA that are 
vulnerable to a multiplicity of challenges because of their impact on thousands 
of citizens. The prestige of the DOJ and the opportunity to work on interesting 
high-profile cases enables the DOJ to hire the best and the brightest on the 
cheap. It would be expensive and wasteful for Congress to hire private attorneys 
on a regular basis to defend federal statutes. Alternatively, Congress itself might 
"lawyer up," developing its capacity to appear in court. 110 But this would likely 
dilute the prestige of the legal counsel for the political branches as each office 
became the arm of a partisan branch of government. 
Second, the line between defending and enforcing a statute may be difficult to 
maintain for long. Any law that the government seeks to use coercively against 
an individual is ripe for constitutional challenge, and this in tum will force the 
104. !d. at 561. 
105. !d. at 576-77. 
106. !d. at 576. 
107. Neither the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel nor the Office of General Counsel of the House 
of Representatives currently has the resources to participate in more than a handful of challenges to 
federal statutes. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REv. 914, 945 (2012). 
108. See Felicia Sonmez, House Raises Salary Cap for DOMA Lawyer to $1.5 Million, WAsH. PosT 
(Oct. 4, 20 II), http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/postlhouse-raises-salary-cap-for-doma-
lawyer-to-15-million/20 1111 0/04/giQAL8biLL_blog.html. 
109. See Ian Millhiser, House Republicans Charged the American Taxpayer $2.3 Million to Lase 
DOMA Case, THINK PROGRESS (June 26, 2013), http:/lthink.progress.org/justice/2013/06/26/2219971/ 
house-republicans-charged-the-american-taxpayer-23-million-to-lose-doma-case/?mobile= nc. The amount 
authorized for the case rose from $500,000 to $3 million as costs "spiraled out of control ... as the case 
wound its way to the Supreme Court." Walter Hickey, John Boehner Committed Six Times as Much 
Government Money as He Originally Said He Would Defending DOMA, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/house-blag-money-doma-paul-clement-2013-3. 
110. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 107, at 968 (arguing that Congress should become a more active 
participant in federal litigation). 
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Government to defend the law or risk its demise. Consider the Clinton Adminis-
tration's decision not to defend a statutory provision that, had it not been 
ultimately repealed, would have required the discharge of HIV-positive mem-
bers of the armed services. 111 If the Clinton Administration had decided to 
enforce the law by instituting discharge proceedings, some of those targeted 
surely would have challenged the provision's constitutionality. Unless a party 
steps into the shoes of the Executive and mounts a serious defense of the law, as 
the House did with DOMA, 112 a court may be reluctant to uphold such an 
undefended law. Moreover, judicial resolution of the matter will not suffer the 
usual delays of adversariallitigation. Thus, the Executive will likely not be able 
to enforce such a law for long, even if it formally appeals adverse judgments by 
lower courts and ultimately petitions for Supreme Court review, as the Obama 
Administration did with DOMA. 
Third, the President's constitutional view may itself impact the law's success 
in litigation. The same day Attorney General Holder- announced the President's 
view of DOMA, the plaintiffs in the lawsuit challenging California's referen-
dum prohibiting same-sex marriage filed a motion to vacate the stay pending 
appeal of the district court's order holding Proposition 8 unconstitutional. 113 
The plaintiffs argued that the stay should be lifted because the Attorney 
General's position meant the proponents of Proposition 8 were not likely to 
succeed on the merits of their appeal. 114 Thus, the President's constitutional 
views, though far from binding precedent, provided additional legal authority 
for advocates of same-sex marriage. Moreover, the Executive Branch has an 
enviable rate of success before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court follows 
the certiorari recommendations of the Office of the Solicitor General almost 
80% of the time, 115 grants the Solicitor General's petitions for certiorari 70% of 
the time, 116 and rules in favor of the government in 60% to 70% of the cases in 
which the government is a party. 117 And of course the Supreme Court ultimately 
agreed with the Obama Administration that Section 3 of DOMA was unconsti-
II I. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 567, 110 
Stat. 186, repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-134, tit. II, § 2707(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-30 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1177 
(Supp. IV 1998)). President Clinton announced in a signing statement that he would enforce but not 
defend the law while he sought its repeal. Statement on Signing the J':lational Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1996, I Pus. PAPERS 226, 227 (Feb. 10, 1996). 
112. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
113. Motion to Vacate Stay Pending Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellees Kristin M. Perry et al. at 4, 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16696). 
114./d.at7. 
115. See David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the View of the Solicitor 
General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 237, 245, 276-77 (2009). 
116. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's Changing Role 
in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1323, 1333 (2010). 
117. See id. at 1334-35. 
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tutional. Although correlation does not equal causation, 118 it makes sense that 
the Supreme Court would give greater respect to the constitutional views of a 
coordinate branch of government headed by the only two political officers 
elected by the whole nation than to the constitutional views of most parties that 
come before it. Indeed, the Supreme Court sua sponte solicits the views of the 
Solicitor General during the certiorari process in about a dozen cases each 
Term. 119 
In sum, though the decision not to defend a federal law is a weak form of the 
extra-legislative veto (it does not automatically implicate the enforcement or 
implementation of a law), like the other extra-legislative vetoes discussed 
herein, it comprises an action taken by the President to undermine or check a 
law that he opposes. Furthermore, it threatens a statute's survival without 
seeking legislative repeal. 
B. EXERCISING ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION: THE DACA PROGRAM 
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act is a 
legislative proposal to create a path to lawful permanent residency, and ulti-
mately citizenship, for a category of illegal immigrants known as "the DREAM-
ers," who came to this country as children and meet certain other criteria. Some 
version of the DREAM Act has been introduced in every congressional session 
since 2001, 120 and President Obama campaigned in 2008 in support of the 
DREAM Act. 121 But after the DREAM Act died in the 112th Congress, Presi-
dent Obama turned to his enforcement discretion to accomplish the goals of the 
legislation. 
On June 15, 2012, President Obama announced the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, in which the administration would sus-
pend deportations under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of a 
then-estimated 800,000 undocumented immigrants who came to the United 
States as children. 122 The persons eligible for "prosecutorial discretion," accord-
ing to a memo issued by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, 
118. The Executive may just be better at picking winners. 
119. See Thompson & Wachtell, supra note 115, at 245. 
120. See H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1751, lllth Cong. 
(2009); S. 729, lllth Cong. (2009); S. 2205, llOth Cong. (2007); S. 774, llOth Cong. (2007); 
H.R. 1275, llOth Cong. (2007); H.R. 5131, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2075, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1545, 
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1684, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 1918, 107th 
Cong. (2001). 
121. Shan Carter et al., On the Issues: Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://elections. 
nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/immigration.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
122. Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at AI; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as 
Children (June 15, 20 12), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. The number of eligible immigrants was initially 
estimated at 800,000 but has since been reported to be as high as 1.7 million. Julia Preston, Young 
Illegal Immigrants Jump at a First Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, at AI. Any immigrant who 
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came to the United States before the age of sixteen; had been residing in the 
country for at least five years preceding the announcement; were currently in 
school or had graduated from high school, obtained a general education develop-
ment certificate, or been honorably discharged from the Coast Guard or the 
Armed Forces of the United States; were below the age of thirty; had not been 
convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, or multiple 
misdemeanor offenses; and did not pose a threat to national security or public 
safety. 123 The criteria for deferred action are remarkably similar to the criteria 
used in various forms of the DREAM Act to describe the DREAMers.124 
Critics declared these actions a manifestation of the "Obama imperial presi-
dency" and charged the President with ignoring his duty to faithfully execute 
the law.125 Professor John Yoo, a lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
during the George W. Bush Administration, accused President Obama of "execu-
tive overreach," writing in National Review that "what we have here is a 
president who is refusing to carry out federal law simply because he disagrees 
with Congress's policy choices."126 
Yoo is right that the DACA program is a policy choice and that President 
Obama is using the program to accomplish much of what he sought to achieve 
through the DREAM Act. No one would suggest that President Obama could 
unilaterally pass the DREAM Act. Can he accomplish essentially the same 
objectives with an enforcement policy?127 Just fifteen months earlier in a town 
hall meeting, President Obama said he could not: 
With respect to the notion that I can just suspend deportations[,] ... that's just 
not the case .... There are enough laws on the books by Congress that are 
entered or is present in the United States in violation of the INA is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2012). 
123. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 122, at I. 
124. Cf H.R. 1751 (authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to cancel the removal of aliens 
who: (I) entered the United States before their sixteenth birthday and have been present in the United 
States for at least five years preceding enactment; (2) are of good moral character; (3) are not 
inadmissible or deportable under specified grounds of the INA; and (4) at the time of application, have 
been admitted to an institution of higher education or have earned a high school or equivalent diploma). 
125. Kimberley A. Strassel, Obama's Imperial Presidency, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2012), http:// 
online. wsj.com/article/SB 1000 1424052702304!41204577506881495497626.html; see John Yoo, Ex· 
ecutive Overreach, N,o;r'L REv. ONLINE (June 15, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/comer/303038/ 
executive-overreach-john-yoo#. 
126. Yoo, supra note 125; see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 785. While at the DOJ's Office of 
Legal Counsel, Yoo defended the President's power to authorize water boarding and other enhanced 
interrogation techniques often regarded as torture, see Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 
Authors of Bush Terror Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at AI, and argued that President Bush was 
not bound by the War Crimes Act, see Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, 
NEWSWEEK (May 16, 2004 ), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/051!6/memos-reveal-war-
crimes-warnings.html. But Yoo distinguishes between presidential decisions not to enforce the law 
based on constitutional objections and those based on policy preferences, approving of the former and 
disapproving of the latter. Yoo, supra note 125. 
127. As explained below in sections III.B and IV.A, the DACA program is almost certainly legal 
under existing law and does not raise serious normative concerns. 
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very clear in terms of how we have to enforce our immigration system that for 
me to simply through executive order ignore those congressional mandates 
would not conform with my appropriate role as President. 128 
The law President Obama referred to is of course the INA, which provides that 
aliens in certain categories, including those who entered or are present in the 
United States in violation of the law "shall, upon the order of the Attorney 
General, be removed" from the United States. 129 Nevertheless, DHS has begun 
issuing work authorizations to immigrants deportable under the INA. 130 
Thus, enforcement discretion has the potential to be a powerful extra-
legislative veto. Although the Obama Administration does not seek wholesale 
repeal of the INA, it has shielded a group of people from the application of the 
law, effectively rewriting the INA (at least temporarily) in the process. 
C. CHECKING STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION: OIRA REVIEW 
Presidents have significantly increased their control over the implementation 
of statutes over the last three decades by centralizing review of regulatory 
initiatives in the Office of Infonnation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) located 
in the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 131 All Execu-
tive Branch agencies are now ~equired to submit proposed rules along with a 
128. Obama, supra note I. 
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). Aliens are "removable" if they were (1) not 
admitted to the United States and were inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 or (2) admitted to the 
United States but deportable under section 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2). Those present in 
the United States in violation of the immigration laws are deportable under 8 U.S.C. § I227(a)(1)(B). 
130. See Marshall Fitz et al., The Early Success of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/ 
news/20 12/ I 0/26/4 3051 /the-early -success-of-the-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-policy. 
131. For a discussion of the use of executive orders to assert executive control over the administra-
tive state, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1263-64 (2006); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the 
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3 (1995). President Ronald Reagan established the fundamental 
framework for White House review through Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988), and Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(1988). President Clinton formally repealed both orders in 1993 but maintained OIRA's centralized 
oversight of regulatory action and many of the substantive principles of review. Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646-48 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). Similarly, Presidents Bush 
and Obama maintained strong White House oversight of agency action, although each modified some 
of its features. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (requiring inter alia 
that agencies identify specific market failures when considering new regulations, submit guidance 
documents to OIRA for review, and obtain the approval of the agency head or a politically appointed 
Regulatory Policy Officer before proposing new regulations), and Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002) (reducing the formal role of the Vice President in OIRA review), with 
Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (directing that each agency submit a plan for 
retrospective review to OIRA), and Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009) 
(President Obama's revocation of Executive Order Numbers 13,258 and 13,422). See generally 
Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 384 (May 20, 2009) (initiating a review of 
state-law-preemption statements included in regulatory preambles over the past decade and restricting 
their future use). 
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regulatory impact analysis for all significant regulations to OIRA before issuing 
a notice of proposed rulemaking to the public. 132 White House review of 
rulemaking offers presidents a ready means of delaying, modifying, or blocking 
proposed regulations. 133 Presidents committed to deregulation have made particu-
larly deft use of it. The George H.W. Bush Administration used the process to 
"weaken, and in some cases eliminate, regulations relating to commercial 
aircraft noise, the protection of wetlands, mandatory recycling, and air pollu-
tion."134 Similarly, during the first six years of the George W. Bush Administra-
tion, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued 86% 
fewer economically significant rules and regulations than it did during the 
Clinton Administration. 135 Officials at OSHA reported that political appointees 
ordered the withdrawal or reconsideration of workplace safety and health 
regulations in response to industry pressure. 136 
But Democratic presidents also use OIRA to block regulations. On September 
2, 2011, for example, President Obama rejected a new National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard for ground ozone proposed by the EPA under the Clean Air 
Act, citing the need to reduce regulatory burdens on businesses and the states 
during a weak economic recovery. 137 The EPA had stated that the new standard 
was required by the Clean Air Act's mandate that the EPA issue ambient air 
quality standards "requisite to protect the public health."138 Many assumed that 
President Obama acted to shield himself from charges of overregulation in the 
upcoming 2012 election, rather than because he disapproved of a stricter 
standard for ground ozone to protect public health. 139 
132. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638,646-48 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
133. For an analysis of the number of proposed rules that were modified or withdrawn altogether 
during the Bush and Obama administrations, see Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight 
of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1127, 1151 (2010) ("[O]ver 90 percent of economically 
significant rules underwent some change or withdrawal during the OIRA review process."). Nicholas 
Bagley and Dean Richard Revesz argue that many of the features of OIRA review create an institutional 
bias against regulation due to the Reagan-era concerns with overregulation. Bagley & Revesz, supra 
note 131, at 1280-82. The review is almost wholly reactive to proposed regulations and systematically 
fails to examine agency failures to regulate. /d. at 1274-78. And with just twenty-two employees 
reviewing six hundred economically significant regulations per year, OIRA has more on its plate than it 
can possibly handle.Jd. at 1277-78. 
134. Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The President's Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the 
Administrative Procedure Act with Regulatory Review, 6 ADMIN. L. REv. AM. U. 759, 762--63 (1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
135. R. Jeffrey Smith, Under Bush, OSHA Mired in Inaction, WASH. PosT (Dec. 29, 2008), http:// 
www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/28/ AR2008122802124. html. 
136. /d. 
137. John M. Broder, Obama Administration Abandons Stricter Air-Quality Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 2, 2011 ), http://www.nytimes.com/20 ll/09/03/science/earth/03air.html?pagewanted =all; Press 
Release, White House, Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011109/02/statement-
president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards. 
138. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938, 2944 (proposed Jan. 19, 2010). 
139. See Amy Harder, Sizing Up Obama's Ozone Standard Delay, NAr'L J. ENERGY ExPERTS BLOG 
(Sept. 6, 20 11), http://energy.nationaljournal.com/20 11109/sizing-up-obamas-ozone-standar.php. 
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Of course, presidents need not wait for OIRA review to block the implementa-
tion of statutory mandates. Presidents have other ways to make their views 
known to the agency heads they appoint. 140 In 2003, the Bush EPA reversed the 
Agency's prior position and concluded in a denial of a petition for rulemaking 
that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse gases because they were 
not "air pollutants" as defined by the Clean Air Act. 141 In addition, the EPA 
stated that even if it had jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions, it 
would decline to do so based on the President's global climate change priori-
ties. 142 These included "calls for near-term voluntary actions and incentives 
along with programs aimed at reducing scientific uncertainties and encouraging 
technological development." 143 As discussed more fully below in section III.C, 
the Bush Administration overplayed its hand. The Court ultimately held that the 
Clean Air Act mandated that the EPA make a determination about whether green-
house gases endangered human health and welfare. 144 Nevertheless, even after the 
Supreme Court's decision, the White House blocked the EPA's efforts to comply with 
the Court's order. When the EPA e-mailed its endangerment report to OIRA, the 
White House refused to open the e-mail and asked the EPA Administrator to 
retract it. 145 Ultimately, the EPA was able to publish an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking stripped of the endangerment finding, merely asking for 
public comments on whether greenhouse-gas emissions pose a threat. 146 Thus, 
the Bush Administration managed to kick the matter to the next president. 
II. THE FUNCTIONS AND RISKS OF THE ExTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 
What functions might an executive check on enacted law serve as a matter 
of constitutional design? Section II.A below begins to answer this question by 
140. For this reason, new presidents often issue moratoriums on rulemaking when they take office, 
directing the agencies to suspend all regulatory initiatives until a political appointee is in place and can 
supervise the agency's agenda. See Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE L.J. 1883, 1941 (2012). 
141. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928 
(Sept. 8, 2003); Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, Gen. Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to 
Marianne L. Horinko, Acting Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA's Authority to Impose Mandatory Con-
trols to Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act (Aug. 28, 2003), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAIEAB _WEB _Docket. nsf/ Attachments%20By%20ParentFilingid/BC82F18 
BAC5D89FF852574170066B7BD/$File/UARG%20Attchmnt%20G ... 43.pdf. For a summary of politi-
cal interference with agency expertise during the George W. Bush Administration, see Jody Freeman & 
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA- From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. Cr. REv. 51, 54-64 (2007). 
142. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,925. 
143. /d. at 52,930; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,511 (2007). 
144. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534. 
145. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open E-mail on Pollutants, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2008, at A15. 
146. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (pro-
posed July 30, 2008). The White House also clarified that the EPA Staff Draft was issued in response to 
the Supreme Court's command and did not represent Administration policy. Policy Memorandum, 
White House, Environmental Protection Agency Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Clean Air Act 1-2 (July 11, 2008), available at http://heartland.org/ 
sites/a!Vmodules/custornlheartland_migration/files/pdfs/23533.pdf. 
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exploring the functions of the veto power that the Framers gave the President in 
Article I of the Constitution. Section II.B then argues that the extra-legislative 
veto can serve similar functions with respect to existing legislation. Neverthe-
less, because the extra-legislative veto exists outside the constitutionally pre-
scribed lawmaking process, it poses distinct threats to our Madisonian system. 
Section II.C identifies these threats, including displacing Congress's supremacy 
in lawmaking, undermining the transparency of changes in government policy, 
and destabilizing the law. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VETO POWER, PAST AND PRESENT 
The Founders granted the President a limited veto for several reasons. First, 
the Founders conceived the veto as a shield for the Presidency to defend itself 
against congressional depredations. 147 Alexander Hamilton, writing as Publius 
in The Federalist No. 73, noted the legislature's propensity to "intrude upon the 
rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments." 148 The men who 
gathered in Philadelphia had seen how the state legislatures in the post-
Revolutionary period had dominated their executives. 149 For this reason, the 
Constitution provided the Executive with the means for its own defense, lest it 
"gradually be stripped of [its] authorities by successive resolutions, or annihi-
lated by a single vote." 150 As Madison put it, "[a]mbition must be made to 
counteract ambition." 151 Accordingly, the President was given the veto power so 
that he could check the legislature's encroachment upon the Executive's constitu-
tional sphere. 
Second, the Founders believed the veto would help protect the nation from 
bad laws: "It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated 
to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any 
impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a ma-
jority of [Congress]." 152 With many onerous parliamentary acts fresh in their 
minds, the Founders were consumed with designing the Constitution to discour-
age bad laws. The veto was conceived to discourage bad laws in three ways. 
First, the Founders believed the President would bring a different perspective to 
legislation by virtue of his unique position as chief magistrate for the whole 
147. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 74-75 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) 
(Elbridge Gerry arguing that the veto would "secure the Executive department [against] legislative 
encroachment"); id. at 74 (James Madison arguing that the veto power "would be useful to the 
Executive, by inspiring additional confidence [and] firmness in exerting the revisionary power"); 
SPITZER, supra note 39, at 15; Kory A. Atkinson, In Defense of Federalism: The Need for a Federal 
Institutional Defender of State Interests, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 93, 112-13 (2003). 
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2009). 
149. SPITZER, supra note 39, at 16. 
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 148, at 371. For this reason, Hamilton vigorously advocated 
giving the Executive an absolute veto. SPITZER, supra note 39, at 12. 
151. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 148, at 264 (James Madison). 
152. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 148, at 371. 
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nation. 153 Accordingly, the President might be able to identify errors over-
looked by the legislature. Second, by returning the bill or resolution to Congress 
for its reconsideration, the President's veto would prompt further deliberation 
on the issue. 154 This is a function of the limited nature of the veto power. With 
an absolute veto, there would be no reason for Congress to reconsider the bill 
in the form presented, although it would still have an incentive to consider 
revisions to respond to the President's specific objections. But with a limited 
veto, Congress can debate a fuller range of policy options: it might abandon its 
effort in the face of presidential resistance, modify the legislation to address the 
President's concerns, or attempt to override the veto. Thus, the constitutional 
veto serves as a deliberation-forcing mechanism. 155 
Finally, although the President's veto was not absolute, it nevertheless re-
quired a certain level of consensus among the nation's political representatives 
to enact law. Because of their fear of bad laws, the Founders erected a system of 
checks and balances that, among other things, makes it difficult to pass most 
significant legislation. 156 All three representative institutions-the House, the 
Senate, and the Presidency-or a two-thirds majority of each house of Con-
gress, must agree to the enactment of new law. 157 Because each democratic 
institution represents a different set of constituents, each brings distinct perspec-
tives to bear on proposed acts. The members of the House represent (in most 
cases) the smallest and most concentrated constituencies, whereas each Senator 
represents a state, and the President represents the nation as a whole. By pro-
viding a voice in the process to political representatives with different constituen-
cies, the Constitution sought to improve the deliberative process and reduce the 
likelihood that Congress would pass bad laws "through haste, inadvertence, or 
design." 158 
There is some debate about whether the Founders envisioned the President 
vetoing legislation based on policy disagreements or primarily to check unconsti-
tutional laws. 159 The text of the Presentment Clause, however, does not restrict 
153. /d. at 372 ("The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in 
the situations of those who are to examine it .... "); see SPITZER, supra note 39, at 17; Atkinson, supra 
note 147, at 113 ("The founders bestowed the president with the veto ... not because they expected the 
president to possess more wisdom and virtue than Congress, but because they expected Congress to 
make mistakes."). 
154. SPITZER, supra note 39, at 9. 
155. /d. 
156. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 148, at 371 (describing bicameralism and pre-
sentment as means of preventing "improper laws"). 
157. u.s. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 148, at 372. 
159. Compare J. Richard Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential Veto, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 95 
(2005) (arguing that presidents should exercise greater restraint when vetoing legislation on policy 
grounds), and Cass R. Sunstein, An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World, 
48 ARK. L. REv. I, 9 (1995) ("[T]he Framers' principal goal was to allow the President to veto laws on 
constitutional, rather than policy, grounds."), with SPITZER, supra note 39, at 18 ("[T]he founders' 
conception of the circumstances under which the veto could be applied, and the quality of the power 
2014] THE EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 375 
the President's discretion in any way. 160 Moreover, the reasons the Founders 
anned the Executive with a veto seem to contemplate disagreements about 
more than constitutional principles. Laws passed "through haste, inadvertence, 
or design" 161 might be constitutional yet bad law from a policy perspective. 
Still, in the early history of the Republic, the veto power was used sparingly and 
mostly justified by the President's constitutional views. It was not until after the 
Civil War that presidents began to use the veto more aggressively as a tool for 
advancing their legislative agendas. 162 
Today, although the President is constitutionally required to give some reason 
for his veto, 163 it is generally believed that he can give any reason at all; the 
only constraint on the exercise of the veto is political. 164 This evolution of the 
veto is part and parcel of the growth of the President's role in the legislative 
process, which in tum reflects the democratization and politicization of the 
office since the founding. 165 Modem presidents are expected to take the lead in 
pushing important legislation through Congress on behalf of their party and the 
electorate that put them in office. 166 The veto and the President's willingness to 
use it for political and policy reasons gives the Executive the tools it needs to 
shape legislation as it works its way through Congress. 167 
Yet the basic function of the veto remains unchanged. It continues to allow 
presidents to defend themselves from legislative encroachments and to protect 
the people from law that is bad in the President's view. Moreover, it remains 
a vehicle for expressing the President's unique political perspective, forcing 
additional congressional deliberation, and ensuring a high level of support 
among our political representatives to enact policy. 
itself, were substantially broader than is typically realized or acknowledged."), and Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 NEB. L. REv. 205, 214 (1999) ("For the 
Framers, the presidential veto could be used for constitutional or policy reasons when appropriate."). 
160. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 7. 
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 148, at 372. 
162. See Broughton, supra note 159, at 124. 
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring the President to return vetoed bills to Congress "with his 
Objections"). 
164. J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good for? War Power, Judicial Review, and Constitutional 
Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 685, 718 (2001). But see Broughton, supra note 159, at 95 (arguing that 
presidents should veto legislation that they deem constitutional but exercise greater restraint when 
vetoing legislation on policy grounds). 
165. For histories of democratization in America, see generally CANDICE J. NELSON, GRANT PARK: THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1968-2008 (2011) (describing the democratization of the 
presidential election as a result of changes in technology, election law, party organization, and demo-
graphics); SEAN WJLENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN (2005) (chronicling 
the rise of democracy in America). For an account of the change in the relationship between the 
President and Congress as a result of the rise of partisan party politics, see generally Daryl J. Levinson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Panies, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2312 (2006). 
166. For example, Democrats criticized President Obama for initially failing to take the lead in 
drafting healthcare legislation and putting forward his own healthcare plan. Theda Skocpol et al., 
Obama's Health Care Mistake?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2009), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/ 19/obamas-health-care-mistake/. 
167. See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note 39, at 20. 
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B. THE BENEFITS OF AN EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 
The extra-legislative veto can serve many of the same positive functions as 
the constitutional veto, bringing the President's unique national perspective168 
to bear on important policy questions, requiring a high level of political support 
to sustain enacted laws, rescuing the people from laws the President finds 
objectionable, encouraging further deliberation regarding contested government 
policies, and shielding the President from the dead hand of past enacting 
coalitions. 
1. Requiring the Executive's Support of Government Policies 
Athough the Founders were preoccupied with preventing the enactment of 
bad laws, they gave less thought to eliminating laws gone bad. That is, laws that 
lose public support because either their original objectives or their unforeseen 
consequences come to be viewed as objectionable. To be sure, Thomas Jeffer-
son famously suggested that each generation should enact its own laws: 
[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The 
earth belongs always to the living generation .... Every constitution then, and 
every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it 
is an act of force and not of right. 169 
Thus, in Jefferson's view, laws must enjoy ongoing popular support to main-
tain their democratic legitimacy; it is not enough that laws are passed through 
democratic processes. Nevertheless, although Jefferson and Hamilton recog-
nized the importance of contemporary support for law's legitimacy, outside the 
context of military appropriations, which the Constitution limits to two years, 170 
168. The Vice President is a second nationally elected political officer, but his policy perspective is 
subservient to that of the President, and we do not expect him to represent us in the same way as the 
President. 
169. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch2s23.html. 
170. Professor Jacob E. Gersen has noted that the one feature of the Constitution that recognizes 
how laws may become odious over time is the limit on Congress's ability to appropriate funds for a 
standing army. Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 251 (2007). The Con-
stitution grants Congress the power "[t]o raise and support Armies" but stipulates that "no Appropria-
tion of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 12. This 
should not be surprising given the Founders' fear of standing armies based on their pre-Revolutionary 
War experience. See THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 148, at 130 (Alexander Hamilton). As 
Professor Gersen has explained, "the appropriations sunset ... force[s] legislators to reconsider the 
need for a standing military, and incorporate information about changing circumstances into legislative 
deliberations." Gersen, supra, at 251. It also helps avoid the tendency for legislative outcomes to be 
shaped by the status quo. ld.; see also Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORo. 243, 250-51 (1987) 
[hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative Procedures] (discussing the impact of the status quo on 
legislative outcomes); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REv. 431, 435-40 ( 1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process] (same). Yet outside the 
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the Founders effectively relied on new legislation, with all the requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment, to repeal laws gone bad. 
Unfortunately, there are difficulties with relying on legislative repeal to 
eliminate bad laws. As with all legislation, any one of the three political in-
stitutions can block repeal. Either the House or Senate alone can kill the bill, 
and the President can force Congress to muster a larger political coalition to 
override his objections. In addition to these constitutional hurdles, bills must 
also negotiate a plethora of congressionally created veto gates in each house. 171 
Bills introduced into either house are generally referred to a committee from 
whence the bill might never emerge without the support of the committee chair 
and a majority of the committee members. 172 This is where most legislation 
dies. 173 Bills that do make it out of committee need the support of the leader-
ship, most importantly the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader in the 
Senate, to get to the floor of the chamber. 174 Indeed, the agenda control 
exercised by the leadership of each house allows a small number of senators or 
representatives to block repeal. 175 But even a bill with the support of the 
leadership might not receive a vote due to the increasingly ubiquitous filibuster 
in the Senate or the Hastert Rule in the House. 176 Moreover, due to increased 
gerrymandering, the majority in control of the House may not have garnered 
the majority of the votes cast in House races nationally. Therefore, a minority 
party in control of the House through gerrymandering may prevent legislative 
action. 177 
context of military appropriations, the Founders did not build any design features into the Constitution 
to account for the way in which permitting the status quo to shape legislative outcomes allows for the 
persistence of laws gone bad. 
171. See generally STEVENS. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CoNGRESS ch. 4 (4th ed. 2006); Eskridge, 
supra note 10; McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 10; McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra 
note 10. 
172. SMITH, supra note 171, at 99-100. 
173. See id. 
174. /d. at 102-07. 
175. /d. at 102-11. 
176. The "Hasten Rule" is an informal rule named after Dennis Hasten, the Republican Speaker 
of the House from 1999 to 2007. The rule requires a majority of the majority party to bring a bill to 
the House floor. George Crawford, The 'Majority of the Majority' Doctrine, HILL (Sept. 19, 2007), 
http :1/thehi II. comlbu si ness-a -1 o bb yi ng/k -street-insi ders/k -street-i nsi ders/20 145-the-rna j ori ty -of-the-
majority-doctrine; Lynn Sweet, Boehner, the Fiscal Cliff and the Majority of the Majority: The Hasten 
Rule, CHI. SuN-TIMES (Dec. 27, 2012), http:/lblogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2012112/boehner_the_fiscal_ 
cliff_and_t.html. 
177. According to the Washington Post, Democratic House candidates won approximately 49% of 
the popular vote cast in House races, compared to 48% for Republicans, but Republicans have their 
second-biggest House majority in sixty years and their third biggest since the Great Depression. Aaron 
Blake, In /996, House Democrats Also Won the Popular Vote but Remained in the Minority (Kind of), 
WASH. PosT (Nov. 12, 20 12), http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/20 12/11112/in-1996-house-
democrats-also-won-the-popular-vote-but-remained-in-the-minority/. Given the Founders' lack of fore-
sight with regard to the role that political parties would play in the Republic, see, e.g., Levinson & 
Pildes, supra note 165, at 2313, they would likely be surprised by how difficult legislative action has 
become. 
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Consequently, even the loss of support by a majority of both houses of 
Congress and the President does not ensure that a law will be repealed. Put 
differently, laws that could never be enacted by the present Congress can endure 
because of legislative roadblocks designed by the Founders and subsequent 
procedural innovations in the rules of each house. 178 
The traditional defense of the legitimacy of old laws is that the sitting 
legislature is presumed to approve them if it does not repeal them. 179 But this is 
a strange fiction considering that congressional inaction is generally considered 
a weak indication of legislative intent. 180 Given the difficulties of the legislative 
process, the failure to repeal a law in no way indicates, without more, that the 
sitting legislature approves it. Whatever we think of the merits of making it 
difficult to change the legal regime, 181 the democratic legitimacy of legislative 
acts can erode over time if that legitimacy is based solely on their enactment. 
Moreover, focusing on legislative changes to the legal regime ignores how 
the meaning and impact of laws evolve with changes outside the pages of the 
U.S. Code. It is impossible to separate law from the environment in which it 
operates. For example, when DOMA was enacted in 1996, it did not have any 
legal effect because same-sex marriage did not exist in any state. 182 Although 
the statute certainly had expressive power, it had no concrete legal effect for 
another seven years, when Massachusetts became the first state to recognize 
same-sex marriages. 183 And before it was declared unconstitutional in 2013, 
DOMA blocked federal recognition of same-sex marriages recognized in thir-
teen states and the District of Columbia. 184 In 1996, the majority of Americans 
opposed same-sex marriage; today, a majority of Americans support it. 185 It 
strains credulity to claim the law has democratic legitimacy today based on a 
vote taken in 1996 when both the world and the law's impact have changed so 
dramatically. DOMA is hardly sui generis. The legal effect of many laws will 
change as the world changes around them. 186 
178. Of course, "[w]hen a motivated majority wishes to act, committees can be bypassed, rules can 
be waived, agendas can be modified, and quick votes can be taken." John C. Roberts & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1817 (2003). 
179. See, e.g., Gumo CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATIITES 109 (1982). 
180. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
187 (1994) (noting that "[c]ongressional inaction lacks persuasive significance" (quoting Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990))). 
181. For discussion of the merits of making it difficult for government to change the background 
legal regime, see infra section II.C.3. 
182. See Sant' Ambrogio & Law, supra note 69, at 722. 
183. Id. at 727. 
184. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
185. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
186. Perhaps the most notorious example is the Alternative Minimum Tax, enacted in the 1960s to 
ensure that the wealthiest Americans would not avoid paying taxes using deductions and tax credits. 
John D. McKinnon, Millions More Could Face AMT Hit, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 21, 2012, at A4. Because 
Congress neglected to index the Alternative Minimum Tax to inflation, each year it threatens an 
ever-growing percentage of Americans with a tax hike, including individuals earning as little as 
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In addition, the breadth of legislative delegations to regulatory agencies and 
the impotence of the nondelegation doctrine raise questions about the demo-
cratic legitimacy of government policies surely unanticipated by the Found-
ers. 187 Today, it is often difficult to ground the political support for government 
policies in the enacting coalitions that gave birth to them. Consider the regula-
tion of greenhouse-gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. The Congress that 
passed the Clean Air Act was unaware of global warming or its relationship to 
greenhouse-gas emissions. 188 Moreover, the immediate problem that Congress 
sought to address was local, ground-level pollution rather than a global atmo-
spheric problem. 189 For these reasons (among others)1 the Bush Administration 
disclaimed jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions under the Clean 
Air Act, contending that the statute was meant to reach only local pollution. 190 
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, embraced regulating greenhouse-
gas emissions using the Clean Air Act, arguing that it was consistent with the 
enacting coalition's more general goal of regulating air pollutants. 191 Each 
administration chose a different level of generality to define the Act's statutory 
mandate, and each argument is plausible based on the text and legislative 
history of the Act. But the lack of a clear meaning undermines the notion that 
the regulation of greenhouse gases can be legitimized democratically solely 
based on the coalitions that passed the Clean Air Act. 192 
Indeed, the Court regularly interprets statutes broadly to apply to problems 
unforeseen by enacting coalitions. 193 The policies implemented pursuant to 
$33,750 per year. /d. Recognizing the lack of democratic legitimacy for such an impact and the uproar 
that would ensue, Congress has passed an annual exemption in recent years to protect middle-class 
families from the law. /d. 
187. There is a substantial amount of literature on the accountability of regulatory agencies acting 
pursuant to broad delegations of authority. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99-102 (1993) (arguing that giving broad 
delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies undermines democratic accountability); Pildes & 
Sunstein, supra note 131, at 8 (advocating for more accountability of regulatory agencies); Peter H. 
Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 775, 781 
(1999) (suggesting ways in which agencies are democratically accountable). 
188. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) ("[T]he Congresses that drafted [the Clean 
Air Act] might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global 
warming."). 
189. Richard A. Epstein, Carbon Dioxide: Our Newest Pollutant, 43 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 797, 
815-16 (2010). 
190. /d. 
191. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
192. A Congressional Connection Poll conducted in June 2012 by United Technologies and National 
Journal, however, found that 55% of Americans believe the EPA should be able to regulate greenhouse-
gas emissions that contribute to climate change. Amy Harder, Poll Finds Public Backs EPA, Not GOP, 
on Mercury, NAT'L J. DAILY (June 19, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/poll-finds-public-
backs-epa-not-gop-on-mercury-20120619. 
193. See, e.g., Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (recognizing that greenhouse gases were unknown to 
Congress when it passed the Clean Air Act); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
79 (1998) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
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regulatory statutes such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 
and many others continue to evolve over time. Indeed, Congress often delegates 
broad policymaking authority to agencies so that the legislation will stand the 
test of time and need not be continually amended as circumstances change. 
There are many reasons to applaud the development of the regulatory state, 194 
but the shift in locus of policymaking from Congress to regulatory agencies 
erodes the democratic legitimacy such policies can claim from long-gone 
enacting coalitions. 195 
To be sure, the President alone cannot supply the same democratic legitimacy 
as bicameralism and presentment. The President's actions do not constitute an 
unmediated expression of the people's will, and he may stray from his electoral 
mandate. Whereas first-term presidents face electoral accountability, second-
term presidents are not directly accountable to the people, although impeach-
ment is always a (remote) possibility. Nevertheless, the extra-legislative veto 
ensures a high level of political support for current government policies in 
the same way the constitutional veto ensures a high level of political support 
for new government policies. 196 If the sitting President undermines a policy 
he opposes, absent a judicial check, 197 the sitting Congress must muster the 
political will to override the President's extra-legislative veto through new 
legislative action-for example, setting enforcement guidelines to eliminate the 
President's enforcement discretion 198 or clarifying a statute to eliminate the 
Executive's "Chevron space"199 -just as Congress needs a high level of politi-
cal support to override an Article I veto. The point is not that the President's 
of 1964 even though it was not the evil Congress sought to address with Title VII); Lyes v. City of 
Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the 
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather 
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed." (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 
79)). 
194. See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PuBLIC INTERESTS: THE PossiBILITY OF Gooo 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008). 
195. This fact explains the tum by many scholars and jurists to the President as a means of providing 
the regulatory agencies with democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administra-
tion, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2331-39 (2001) (arguing that the President should shape the discretion 
delegated to agencies because of his democratic accountability); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place 
for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 42-45 (2009) (arguing that crediting 
agencies' political reasons for policy choices would improve political accountability). 
196. Of course, the extra-legislative veto has the most democratic legitimacy when used against laws 
that the President has campaigned against. By contrast, if the President has acquiesced or succumbed to 
the passage of the legislation during his own term, then the extra-legislative veto merely provides a 
second bite at the apple in the face of strong support for the law and is not democracy enhancing. 
197. For discussion of judicial review, see infra section II.C & Part III. 
198. For discussion of constraints on enforcement discretion, see infra section III.B. 
199. Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and 
"Skidmore Weight," 112 CoLUM. L. REv. 1143, 1145 (2012) ('"Chevron space' denotes the area within 
which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal 
obligations or constraints-that is, its delegated or allocated authority."). For discussion of constraints 
on statutory implementation, see infra section III. C. 
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actions are always democratically legitimate; rather, it is that laws without the 
robust, contemporary political support necessary to override an extra-legislative 
veto are democratically suspect. 
2. Protecting the People from Laws Gone Bad 
The extra-legislative veto, like the constitutional veto, is a powerful tool for 
protecting the people from what the President views as bad laws, or more 
specifically laws gone bad.Z00 These include laws that come to be viewed as 
obsolete or oppressive due to fundamental social, economic, and political 
change; general laws that do not fit well with the specific facts of individual 
cases or new circumstances; and laws that cannot achieve all their goals with 
the resources available. 
a. Adapting to Fundamental Social, Economic, and Political Change. The 
extra-legislative veto can protect individual liberties in a rapidly evolving 
society. Because rights and liberties are dynamic and expansive concepts, the 
oppressive nature of a law may not be apparent or widely appreciated until long 
after enactment. Both DADT and DOMA are good examples of such laws. 
Passed with strong public support in 1993 and 1996 respectively, a majority of 
Americans, the Executive Branch, and the Senate came to view the laws as 
oppressive to gay and lesbian citizens. The shift in public opinion was dramatic. 
In 1993, an ABC/Washington Post poll found that only 44% of Americans 
supported allowing gays and lesbians serving openly in the military.Z01 By 
2008, another ABC/Washington Post poll found that 75% of Americans be-
lieved they should be able to serve openly. 202 The shift in public opinion 
regarding DOMA and same-sex marriage was similarly dramatic.Z03 President 
Obama's efforts to repeal DADT and DOMA, as well as his decision to abandon 
the legal defense of DOMA when repealing it failed, reflected this change in 
public attitudes concerning individual rights.204 
The extra-legislative veto can also help negotiate conflicts between state and 
federal law where there are differences in social, cultural, and political views 
among the states. In 2012, voter initiatives in Colorado and Washington legal-
ized the possession of small amounts of marijuana, yet the same conduct 
200. Naturally, whether we believe the extra-legislative veto is desirable in specific contexts will 
depend on our opinion of the law in question. But this is no different than the constitutional veto. 
201. Emily B. Guskin, Attitudes Towards 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy Radically Change, ABC 
NEws (July 19, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/Politics/story?id=5387980&page= 
l#.UH7XeVGqSZQ. 
202. !d. 
203. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra section l.A. A decision not to enforce DOMA-that is, directing the federal 
government to recognize same-sex marriages under state law-would of course be a much more 
powerful extra-legislative veto. 
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remains illegal under federal law?05 The voter initiatives may be part of a 
growing acceptance of marijuana: a 2012 Gallup poll found that 50% of 
Americans support legalization.206 Following the state initiatives, President 
Obama stated it was not a "top priority" to go after "recreational users in states 
that have determined that it's legal."207 Deputy Attorney General James Cole 
subsequently announced that the DOJ would exercise a degree of prosecutorial 
discretion in states that implement "strong and effective regulatory and enforce-
ment systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of 
marijuana,"208 although it is too early to say precisely how this policy will 
operate in practice. In recognition of federalism values and certain states' desire 
to decriminalize the use of marijuana, the Executive might generally refrain 
from enforcement efforts in states that have legalized the use of marijuana 
under certain conditions. 
In the words of Justice Scalia, there is nothing wrong if "important legislative 
purposes, [once] heralded in the halls of Congress," are "lost or misdirected in 
the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy .... Yesterday's herald is today's 
bore .... "209 Citing the example of the Sunday blue laws, which were "unen-
forced long before they were widely repealed," Justice Scalia argues that such 
abandonment can be "one of the prime engines of social change.'mo The 
extra-legislative veto both responds to and accelerates social, economic, or 
political change. 
b. Curing the Poor Fit of General Laws to Specific Cases. Some form of 
extra-legislative veto is indispensable in a system of separation of powers? 11 
205. Charlie Savage, Administration Weighs Legal Action Against States that Legalized Marijuana 
Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2012, atA20. 
206. Sarah Kliff, Can Colorado Create a Legal Market for Marijuana?, WASH. PosT WONKBLOG 
(Nov. I, 20 12), http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/20 12/11/0 l!can-colorado-create-a-
1egal-market-for-marijuana. 
207. Rachel Weiner, Obama: I've Got "Bigger Fish to Fry" than Pot Smokers, WASH. PosT 
WONKBLOG (Dec. 14, 20 12), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/20 12/12/14/obama-
ive-got-bigger-fish-to-fry-than-pot-smokers. 
208. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guidance 
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; see Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOl Will 
Let Washington, Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HuFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/20 13/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-doj_n_383 7034. 
html. 
209. Antonio Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 897 (1983) (quoting Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm'n v. Atomic 
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
210. /d. 
211. Separation of powers is, as one scholar has put it, "an area of political thought in which there 
has been an extraordinary confusion in the definition and use of terms." M.J.C. VILE, CoNSTITUTIONAL-
ISM AND THE SEPARATION OP PowERS 2 (2d ed. 1998). There is no constitutional provision expressly 
mandating separation of powers. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 
124 HARV. L. REv. 1939, 1944-45 (2011). Madison proposed an amendment to the Constitution that 
would have made it explicit, but it was not adopted. /d. at 2015 & n.382 (citing 12 THE PAPERS OP JAMES 
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The traditional goal of separation of powers is to protect individual liberty from 
tyrannical government. The Federalist No. 47 warns that "[t]he accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of 
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'m 2 As Montesquieu ex-
plained in The Spirit of the Laws, "[w]hen legislative power is united with 
executive power in a single person or in a single body, ... there is no liberty, 
because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical 
laws will execute them tyrannically."213 Put differently, when legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial powers are combined, each law becomes a bill of attainder 
declaring a person or group of persons guilty of a crime without trial. If the 
Legislature is deprived of the opportunity to enforce and interpret the law, it 
will focus on drafting generally applicable laws for the public good. 
The benefit of generally applicable rules is that they are not shaped by 
individual cases; the drawback of generally applicable rules is that they do not 
always fit well with individual cases. In particular, when Congress legislates 
against a background of uncertainty, it will be unable to anticipate all of the 
ways in which a law might be applied or its collateral consequences. Moreover, 
because Congress is often driven by individual events even as it seeks to enact 
generally applicable laws, we often get the worst of both worlds-laws respon-
sive to specific events that are drafted in the garb of generally applicable 
rules.214 
Consequently, the Executive must often fit general laws to specific problems, 
as a tailor alters a suit off the rack-taking in a little here, letting out a little 
there. For example, the poor fit between the Clean Air Act's local pollution 
controls and greenhouse-gas emissions from automobiles, which are distributed 
relatively evenly across the planet after entering the atmosphere,215 caused the 
Bush Administration to claim that the EPA did not have jurisdiction to regulate 
greenhouse-gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.216 The Supreme Court and 
the Obama Administration of course disagreed with this position.Z17 Neverthe-
less, when the Obama EPA proceeded to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions, it 
confronted a statutory requirement that any source of 100 tons per year of a 
MADISON 202 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979)). But the Court has inferred the 
principle from the structure of the government established by the Constitution and the vesting clauses 
for each branch. See generally, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
212. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 148, at 245 (James Madison). 
213. MoNTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 157 (Anne M. Cobler et al. eds. trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1989). 
214. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. I 07-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
215. Epstein, supra note 189, at 817-18. 
216. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
217. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 
(Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
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pollutant obtain a permit.218 Because greenhouse gases are emitted at such 
levels by far more sources than other pollutants regulated under the Act, the 
EPA faced the prospect of subjecting thousands of residential homes, apartment 
buildings, and small businesses to the permitting provisions of the Clean Air 
Act.219 This would have overwhelmed the EPA and significantly burdened 
entities never before regulated under the Clean Air Act.220 Accordingly, the EPA 
issued timing and tailoring rules that shielded many greenhouse-gas-emissions 
sources from permitting that otherwise would have been required by the plain 
language of the Act.221 
Similarly, the DACA program responded to the poor fit between the INA 
(with its general command that those in violation of the Act "shall, upon the 
order of the Attorney General, be removed" from the United States)222 and the 
circumstances of young immigrants who were brought to this country by their 
parents as children, grew up and attended school here, and consider themselves 
Americans. There is no evidence that the enacting coalitions that constructed 
our immigration laws thought about individuals in this category.Z23 Thus, 
ripping these young people from their families and communities may have 
negative consequences unintended by Congress. As the Supreme Court has 
explained: 
The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including 
whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the 
community, or a record of distinguished military service .... Returning an 
alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has 
committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The 
foreign state may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or 
enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be 
harmed upon return. 224 
218. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
31,514, 31,517 (June 3, 2010) ("[S]tate and local permitting authorities would be burdened by the 
extraordinary number of these permit applications, which are orders of magnitude greater than 
the current inventory of permits and would vastly exceed the current administrative resources of the 
permitting authorities."). 
219. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 31,517. 
220. /d. 
221. !d. 
222. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). Aliens are "removable" if they were (1) not admitted 
to the United States and were inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 or (2) admitted to the United States 
but deportable under section 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2). Those present in the United 
States in violation of the immigration laws are deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l)(B). 
223. Even when the legislative record suggests that some members of Congress raised the pros-
pect of such consequences, the final legislation may not definitively resolve Congress's position on the 
matter. Those that voted for the legislation might have intended such consequences or they might have 
ignored the concerns, accepted them as part of a compromise, or discounted the possibility of such 
consequences. 
224. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
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Although we generally think of prosecutorial discretion being exercised on a 
case-by-case basis, in a large, advanced society many cases will share common 
characteristics. It is more efficient for the Executive to define categories of cases 
that represent poor fits with the law than to repeatedly adjudicate common 
issues in each individual case?25 
c. Prioritizing Among Competing Goals. The extra-legislative veto can also 
channel limited resources toward achieving what the President views as a law's 
highest priorities. Most laws seek to achieve more than one objective. The 
Clean Air Act seeks to reduce air pollution and to allow for reasonable eco-
nomic growth. 226 Intellectual property law seeks both to encourage innovation 
and to provide for the dissemination of inventions for the public good. 227 The 
criminal justice system seeks to deter criminal behavior, punish those convicted 
of crimes, and rehabilitate offenders who have served their sentences.228 Immi-
gration law similarly serves multiple goals. It seeks to control our national 
borders by denying entry to criminals and security risks, 229 to track foreign 
nationals within our borders, to preserve employment opportunities for citizens 
and residents by "combating the employment of illegal aliens,'mo and to 
regulate our relations with foreign nations. 231 The relative importance of these 
goals changes over time. After September 11, 2001, for example, the law 
enforcement aspects of immigration law became more pressing?32 The extra-
legislative veto allows the Executive to juggle these competing statutory goals 
and adapt enforcement priorities to the changing environment. 
The DACA program provides a rational way to prioritize the INA's many 
objectives in the face of limited resources and millions of immigrants subject to 
removal.233 It signals the Executive's focus on removing dangerous undocu-
mented immigrants and deferring action against those who did not consciously 
violate the INA and who have a good track record in this country. Beyond 
husbanding scarce resources, such prioritization allows the Executive to avoid 
225. Cf. Michael D. Sant' Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1992, 2041-63 (2012) (proposing ways in which administrative agencies can more efficiently, 
consistently, and accessibly adjudicate cases with common questions of law or fact). 
226. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1984). 
227. See U.S. CoNST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress has power to "promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts"). 
228. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES ch. 2 (9th ed. 2012). 
229. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) ("Federal law makes a single sovereign 
responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the 
Nation's borders.") 
230. ld. at 2504 (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)). 
231. !d. at 2498. 
232. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 54-56 (1983) 
(approving the consideration of public reaction when implementing the law). 
233. "The Obama administration spent nearly $18 billion on immigration enforcement [in 2012], 
significantly more than its spending on all the other major federal law enforcement agencies com-
bined .... " Julia Preston, Huge Amounts Spent on Immigration, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, 
at All. 
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cases that might undermine the law's legitimacy. Deporting young immigrants 
in good standing who were brought to this country as children may erode public 
support for immigration policy, while doing little to discourage illegal immigra-
tion or secure our borders?34 Thus, the extra-legislative veto may help further 
the core purposes of the law by checking its application in certain cases. 
3. Forcing Congressional Deliberation 
Like the constitutional veto, the extra-legislative veto can prompt congres-
sional deliberation. If it is transparent,235 the Executive's action invites public 
debate and a congressional response. In addition, the extra-legislative veto can 
provide concrete data to fuel deliberation concerning further legislative action. 
When the 113th Congress considers the DREAM Act, it will have a sense of 
what implementation might look like based on the DACA program. How many 
immigrants have applied for the program? Where do they live? What are they 
doing? In this way, the extra-legislative veto can play both a deliberation-
forcing and deliberation-enhancing role. 
To be sure, even if transparent, the extra-legislative veto will not always 
result in congressional deliberation. The congressional reaction is a function of 
the political landscape and whether Congress is willing and able to override the 
President's extra-legislative veto. But this is no different than the constitutional 
veto. Congress is not obligated to reconsider a vetoed bill and frequently does 
not.236 
4. Protecting the President from Past Enacting Coalitions 
The extra-legislative veto is less vital as a tool for protecting the institution of 
the Presidency from the Legislature. In general, we can rely on each president 
to look out for the interests of the Office of the President in addition to his 
own policy agenda?37 There are of course exceptions. Presidents will some-
times sign laws they feel intrude upon executive power because it is necessary 
to obtain another objective. 238 They may register their objections in signing 
statements rather than vetoing the legislation?39 But we generally expect 
234. Cf Wait Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[A] rule is more likely to be 
undercut if it does not in some way take into account considerations of hardship, equity, or more 
effective implementation of overall policy, considerations that an agency cannot realistically ignore, at 
least on a continuing basis. The limited safety valve permits a more rigorous adherence to an effective 
regulation.") 
235. See infra section II.C.2. 
236. See SPITZER, supra note 39, at 103 tb1.3-4. 
237. It is now something of a truism that presidential candidates who run against abuses of executive 
power are quick to utilize those same powers once elected. See, e.g., Charlie .Savage, Shift on Executive 
Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, at A I. 
238. For example, presidents long objected to the legislative veto that Congress wrote into hundreds 
of laws but agreed to it in exchange for broad delegations of authority. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919,968-74 (1983) (reviewing the history of the legislative veto). 
239. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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presidents to protect the prerogatives of the office when presented with congres-
sional legislation, if only because they do not want to tie their own hands in the 
future. 
Nevertheless, the extra-legislative veto does protect the President from con-
flicts of interest with his political constituencies created by the choices of the 
past. Soon after taking office, the Obama Administration found itself in the 
uncomfortable position of defending DOMA despite the strong opposition of 
many of Obama's political supporters.Z40 Moreover, the Administration was 
forced to make legal arguments about marriage and same-sex relationships that 
many of his constituents found offensive.241 Similarly, many Latino groups-
another important constituency-criticized the Obama Administration for deport-
ing an unprecedented number of immigrants pursuant to the INA.242 In both 
cases, the extra-legislative veto protected the President from conflicts with his 
constituency based on legislative bargains struck by enacting coalitions that had 
left the political stage. 
C. THE RISKS PRESENTED BY THE EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 
Although the extra-legislative veto shares many similarities with the Article I 
veto power, an executive check on existing law also poses distinct dangers to 
our Madisonian system because it operates outside the constitutionally pre-
scribed lawmaking process. These dangers include displacing Congress's pri-
mary role in lawmaking, undermining the transparency of government policy, 
and creating excessive policy instability. 
1. The Threat of Executive Lawmaking 
Extra-legislative vetoes risk executive lawmaking. They allow the Executive 
unilaterally to alter the rights, duties, and relations of parties and upset legisla-
tive bargains. Nevertheless, in most cases such executive lawmaking does not 
raise substantial concerns because it operates within statutory constraints. Thus, 
only in the most extreme cases does the extra-legislative veto risk creating a 
Legislator in Chief. 
a. Altering Rights, Duties, and Relations. The Supreme Court has defined 
lawmaking as "altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons."243 Not 
all extra-legislative vetoes alter rights, duties, or relations. For example, the 
decision not to defend a statute while continuing to enforce it does not impact 
rights, duties, or relations of persons (other than the duty of DOJ lawyers to 
defend the law) unless and until a court holds the law unconstitutional. Thus, it 
240. See Savage, supra note 82. 
241. Id. 
242. Corey Dade, Obama Administration Deported Record 1.5 Million People, NPR (Dec. 24, 
20 12), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/20 12112124/167970002/obama-administration-deported-
record-1-5-million-people. 
243. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. 
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does not constitute executive lawmaking. But many extra-legislative vetoes do. 
The DACA program, for example, provides a two-year stay from deportation 
and work authorization during the period. 244 Some states are now providing 
other benefits such as driver's licenses to the beneficiaries of the program.245 
Thus, the DACA program has a profound (albeit not necessarily permanent) 
impact on the rights of its beneficiaries. Similarly, the decision not to regulate 
greenhouse-gas emissions or not to tighten the pollution standard for ground 
ozone impacts the duties of entities subject to the requirements of the Clean Air 
Act. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has approved executive lawmaking pursu-
ant to statutory delegations of authority.246 For many of the reasons discussed 
above in section II.B, Congress sometimes expressly delegates extra-legislative 
vetoes to the Executive Branch. In INS v. Chadha, for example, the Court 
approved the Attorney General's suspension of Chadha's deportation based on 
"extreme hardship" because it was authorized by the INA.247 Such vetoes do 
not raise concerns with executive lawmaking, except to the extent that they raise 
nondelegation problems, because they are expressly authorized by statute. 
Other extra-legislative vetoes are not expressly authorized by statute but take 
advantage of ambiguities in the statutory text. For example, when the Bush 
Administration checked the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions, it first 
interpreted the Clean Air Act as not applying to greenhouse-gas emissions. 
Though this is distinguishable from the deportation suspension in Chadha, 
which was expressly authorized by the INA, it still purports to operate within 
the constraints of the statutory text. Ultimately, the Court disagreed with the 
EPA's interpretation, concluding that greenhouse-gas emissions constitute "air 
pollutant[s]" under the Act and that the EPA Administrator was required to form 
a judgment concerning whether they "endanger public health or welfare."248 
Thus, extra-legislative vetoes exercised by means of statutory interpretation will 
face a judicial check when they directly conflict with clear statutory mandates. 
But the Supreme Court recognized in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. that some statutory interpretation by the Execu-
tive fills gaps left by Congress either because it did not consider the question or 
"was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question."249 Such 
executive lawmaking is constrained by statute in the sense that there are limits 
244. See Fitz et al., supra note 130. 
245. See, e.g., Press Release, Mich. Dep't of State, State to Issue Driver's Licenses to Qualified 
Deferred Action Program Participants After Federal Government Reversal (Feb. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,4670, 7-127--294244--rss,OO.html. 
246. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.l6 (noting that "the Executive's ... activity cannot reach beyond the 
limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I"). The President may also 
be able to alter rights, duties, and relations pursuant to certain self-executing constitutional powers, 
such as the pardon power. 
247. /d. at 924. 
248. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-34 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 752l(a)(l) (2006). 
249. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984). 
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to the extent of executive lawmaking that the text of the statute will bear, but it . 
is a form of executive lawmaking nonetheless. 
Still other extra-legislative vetoes eschew any reliance on statutory delega-
tions of authority. The exercise of enforcement discretion, for example, does not 
purport to exercise authority delegated by statute. Rather, it is a decision not to 
apply the statute in certain cases. At best, the President can claim that Congress 
legislates against a background presumption that the Executive will exercise 
some enforcement discretion when taking care that the laws are faithfully 
executed. But it will be difficult to draw the line between enforcement discre-
tion that is anticipated by Congress and that which is not, or between permis-
sible enforcement discretion and that which risks abdicating the Executive's 
responsibilities under the statute.250 
Finally, the decision not to enforce a law or a specific legal provision at all 
eschews any reliance on statutory authority, instead generally looking to the the 
Constitution for legal authority. Indeed, it is a decision to ignore a law's clear 
statutory mandate. Thus, it is a particularly strong form of unilateral executive 
lawmaking and threatens to turn the President into a Legislator in Chief. 
b. Upsetting Legislative Bargains. By altering rights, duties, and relations 
between persons, the extra-legislative veto risks upsetting legislative bargains. 
The decision not to enforce a law obviously disrupts the deal that produced it. 
But extra-legislative vetoes implemented through enforcement discretion and 
statutory interpretation may disrupt bargains as well. If we understand the 
legislative process as involving horse trading and negotiated compromises, the 
extra-legislative veto may privilege certain members of the enacting coalition. A 
statute might be drafted at a level of generality to bring three types of behavior 
within its jurisdiction and secure the support of three distinct congressional 
caucuses. To the extent the extra-legislative veto ignores one or more of these 
concerns, it will upset the bargain made by the enacting coalition, even if the 
Executive does not abdicate its responsibilities under the statute. 
In addition, it will often be difficult for Congress to enforce these types of 
legislative deals. If the Executive undermines the objective of only one of three 
members of the enacting coalition, the other two will likely have no incentive to 
enforce the original bargain with greater specificity. 251 Indeed, they might even 
prefer the new legal status quo. 
In sum, the extra-legislative veto usually involves some degree of executive 
lawmaking. In most but not all cases, the scope of executive lawmaking is 
limited by statutory constraints. But even extra-legislative vetoes that operate 
within statutory constraints have the potential to upset legislative bargains. 
250. See infra section III.B. 
251. See, e.g., McNollgast, Administrative Procedure, supra note 170, at 250-51; McNollgast, 
Structure and Process, supra note 170, at 435-40. 
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2. Undermining the Transparency of Changes in Policy 
Because the extra-legislative veto exists outside the legislative process, there 
are fewer formal mechanisms to ensure its transparency. The most transparent 
forms of the extra-legislative veto are decisions not to defend a statute because 
they are disclosed in court. In addition, the Executive must by law notify 
Congress when it decides not to defend or enforce an act of Congress.252 There 
is no requirement, however, that the Executive disclose enforcement discretion 
policies?53 Theoretically, White House review of rulemaking should be more 
consistently transparent than enforcement policies. Executive Order 12,866 
requires OIRA to maintain information related to written communications 
with the agency and oral communications with individuals outside the Execu-
tive Branch?54 But gaps remain-for example, oral communications between 
OIRA and the agency need not be disclosed255 -and none of the disclosure 
requirements are judicially enforceable. 256 Consequently, OIRA sometimes fails 
to comply with its disclosure requirements?57 In addition, because courts 
(a) generally avoid examining the actual reasons behind agency action, taking at 
face value the reasons proffered by the agency, 258 and (b) recognize various 
executive privileges,259 White House control of agency action can be opaque. 
Consequently, the transparency of enforcement discretion and White House 
control of rulemaking often depends on the incentives for disclosure. This is a 
function of politics (how Congress and the public are likely to respond) and 
policy imperatives. President Obama certainly had a strong incentive to disclose 
the DACA program to buttress support from a key constituency. Moreover, it 
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006). 
253. See infra Part III. 
254. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) 
(requiring a public log of all written communications forwarded to the agency as part of the review 
process and the dates, subject matter, and persons involved in all substantive oral communications 
between OIRA and individuals outside the Executive Branch). 
255. /d. 
256. /d. § 10 ("[T]his Executive order ... does not create any right or benefit, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumen-
talities, its officers or employees, or any other person."). 
257. See RENA STEINWR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DooRS tXf THE WHITE 
HousE 7 (2011) (finding that OIRA routinely violated the executive order's disclosure requirements); 
Bagley & Revesz, supra note 131, at 1309-10 (describing OIRA's history of secrecy); Nina A. 
Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1343, 
1354 (2011) (noting OIRA's lack of transparency). 
258. "[A]n agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself." 
Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)). But see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (suggesting that the President's role may need to be disclosed when the agency relies 
upon information or data obtained from the President in formulating a rule). A scholarly debate has 
arisen recently about whether courts should grant greater deference to agency decision making when 
the President is actively involved. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 133, at 1151; Watts, supra note 195, 
at 8. 
259. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(upholding deliberative process and attorney-client privilege claims of the Executive Branch). 
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would be impossible to implement a program on the scale of DACA without 
substantial public communications. Indeed, there are often incentives to dis-
close enforcement priorities to shape behavior, encourage voluntary compli-
ance, and reduce enforcement costs.Z60 And agencies must give reasons for 
denying petitions for rulemaking. But when the extra-legislative veto may upset 
a powerful or vocal constituency or deliver benefits to a narrow interest at 
public expense, there will be no incentive for the White House to act transpar-
ently. The Bush DOJ, for example, had little incentive to publicly declare its 
. suspension of pattern and practice race-discrimination suits under Title VII.261 
Nor did it have an incentive to disclose its efforts to prevent the EPA from 
making an endangerment finding concerning greenhouse-gas emissions.262 
a. Stealth Repeals to Please Special Interests. Nontransparent extra-legisla-
tive vetoes give special interests with White House access another opportunity 
to stifle policies they oppose. Although the President's constitutional veto was 
intended to kill bad laws, without transparency the extra-legislative veto pro-
vides another opportunity for special interests to kill good laws. The President's 
stature means he is more accessible to well-established interests (whether 
energy companies or unions) than to the less powerful or well connected. 
Consequently, nontransparent extra-legislative vetoes allow for stealth repeals 
of statutory mandates to please special interests. 
b. Increasing Congressional Monitoring Costs. Nontransparent extra-legisla-
tive vetoes also increase congressional monitoring costs. Unlike the constitu-
tional veto, the extra-legislative veto can be exercised at any time. The President 
need not wait for congressional action. He alone determines when, where, and 
how to exercise the extra-legislative veto. Consequently, Congress must always 
be on the lookout for stealth repeals. 
In addition, when presented with an extra-legislative veto, Congress must 
deliberate over its course of action. Will it step into the shoes of the DOJ to 
defend a statute? Will it attempt to pass new legislation to constrain the 
Executive's enforcement discretion? Will it take a more active role in setting 
regulatory standards? The choices Congress makes may have opportunity costs, 
limiting the amount of time that can be devoted to new legislative projects. 
Congress must find additional time, develop relevant expertise, and resolve 
internal conflicts to respond to the Executive's actions. In addition, Congress 
will face the prospect of the President's Article I veto. 
Nevertheless, the extra-legislative veto obviates the need for Congress to 
anticipate every circumstance in which the law might be applied poorly, allow-
ing the Executive to check these poor applications. This saves the drafting 
260. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 172 & n.85 (1996). 
261. CmZENs' CoMM'N ON CiVIL RIGHTS & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 20, at 29. 
262. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. 
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Congress time. Consequently, savings in drafting costs on the front end may 
offset the additional monitoring costs on the back end. 
3. Destabilizing Government Policy 
The Constitution improves the predictability, stability, and continuity of 
government policy through various mechanisms to check the passions of pass-
ing majorities and ensure a consensus among a majority coalition before turning 
the ship of state. As with constitutional commitments and stare decisis, the 
difficulty of changing the legal background regime allows parties to order their 
affairs with greater certainty about the future. This in turn makes them more 
willing to invest in the future, increasing the productive activity of society. The 
extra-legislative veto threatens to upset this stability by making it easier for the 
President to change policy unilaterally and by subjecting government programs 
to the whims of each new administration.Z63 
But the value of predictability for ordering our affairs must be balanced 
against the value of creating good law. Bad law may engender less-than-optimal 
ordering of affairs, whereas eliminating bad law may facilitate more socially 
useful activities. Put simply, there is less value in the predictability and continu-
ity of government policy when it is bad policy. In some cases, the bad policy 
may not produce any positive ordering of affairs. For example, it is difficult to 
imagine any positive ordering of affairs premised on DOMA. Quite the oppo-
site: the productive ordering possible with DOMA's repeal is demonstrated 
wherever same-sex marriages have been legalized. Thus, there was little value 
to the predictability and continuity of this policy other than the expressive value 
to those who opposed same-sex marriage for ideological reasons. In other cases, 
bad policies will engender reliance interests that produce some positive ordering 
of affairs, even if the policy is not optimal from a social-welfare standpoint. 
For example, certain government subsidies may be economically wasteful yet 
may encourage investments with collateral benefits based on the recipient's 
belief that the subsidies will continue. Nevertheless, if a policy produces little or 
no positive ordering of affairs compared to an alternative policy, then stability 
and continuity are less important. 
Perhaps for this reason, the Framers' central design objective was to prevent 
the enactment of bad law, not to make changes to the legal status quo difficult 
per se. They created three lawmaking institutions designed to be responsive to 
263. It is questionable whether the entrenchment of ordinary legislation can meet the demand for 
predictability. Despite the difficulty of repeal, when Mitt Romney ran in 2012 on a platform of 
repealing the Affordable Care Act, numerous states delayed developing health insurance exchanges 
under the Act, awaiting the outcome of the presidential election, Abby Goodnough & Michael Cooper, 
Health Law Has States Feeling Tense Over Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2012, at A20, even though 
commentators pointed out that repeal was unlikely with the Democrats in control of the Senate, see, 
e.g., Ryan Lizza, Why Romney Won't Repeal Obamacare, NEw YORKER (June 28, 2012), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/06/why-romney-wont-repeal-obamacare.htrnl. Thus, 
highly salient and closely contested laws will likely be viewed as vulnerable to shifting political 
majorities and administrations, regardless of the difficulties of the legislative repeal process. 
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distinct yet overlapping constituencies at different times, thereby insulating the 
lawmaking process from the danger of fleeting passions among a segment of the 
electorate. Nevertheless, the Framers generally favored simple-majority control 
of most ordinary legislation, in contrast to the supermajority requirements of the 
Articles of Confederation, and disapproved the ability of a small number of 
legislators to thwart the majority's will.Z64 Indeed, the Founders would likely be 
dismayed to learn that barriers to the passage of bad laws, once breached, 
prevent the same bad laws from being repealed. 
Thus, although policy stability is valuable when it engenders productive 
ordering of affairs in reliance upon those policies, it must be balanced against 
the value of eliminating bad law. In addition, the scale and duration of instabil-
ity matters. Dramatic shifts in policy with each new administration are more 
troubling than incremental shifts, and repeated swings are more troubling than 
conclusive ends to policies against which the public has turned. As discussed 
more fully below in Part III, we must rely on Congress to set limits on the scale 
of policy changes that may be implemented by the extra-legislative veto and on 
the Judiciary to enforce those limits. Within these boundaries, the frequency and 
duration of policy oscillation will ultimately depend on the strength and stabil-
ity of the electorate's own preferences. 
*** 
Having identified the functions and dangers of the extra-legislative veto, the 
next Part turns to how the Supreme Court reviews this exercise of power. 
III. JuDICIAL REVIEW OF ExTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETOES 
Notwithstanding Justice Jackson's declaration that the President's power is at 
its lowest ebb when he takes "measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress,"265 the Supreme Court uses a variety of administra-
tive law doctrines to grant significant leeway in the timing and manner by which 
the President must meet his "take care" responsibilities. Though the Court 
enforces legislative bargains that are clear, specific, and drafted in the language 
of command, the Executive generally has the power to check statutory mandates 
outside the legislative process. Thus, the Court protects the most transparent 
congressional bargains and leaves enforcement of unarticulated or ambiguous 
legislative deals to the discretion of future administrations and the will of the 
sitting Congress. In this way, the Supreme Court facilitates some of the benefits 
264. During the constitutional debates, Alexander Hamilton remarked: 
Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a 
Polish diet, where a single veto has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A 
sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has 
several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations 
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 148, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton). 
265. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952). 
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of the extra-legislative veto, while controlling the risk of presidential law-
making and excessive policy destabilization. 
A. DECISIONS NOT TO DEFEND A STATUTE 
In United States v. Windsor, the Court expressed some misgivings about the 
Obama Administration's decision not to defend DOMA, but it did not hold that 
the Executive had violated any constitutional or statutory duty.266 Thus, al-
though there is ultimately a judicial check on this type of extra-legislative veto, 
because a court will decide whether the law is constitutional,267 the decision not 
to defend appears to be an unreviewable political question to which the Court 
defers to the President. 
B. DECISIONS NOT TO ENFORCE A STATUTE 
Agency decisions not to institute enforcement proceedings are presumptively 
unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).Z68 In Heckler v. 
Chaney, prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by 
lethal injection of drugs petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
take various enforcement actions against the use of the drugs because they were 
not approved for use in human executions under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA).Z69 The FDA disputed its jurisdiction under the Act but argued that 
even if it did have jurisdiction, it had inherent discretion not to pursue enforce-
ment proceedings based on the Commissioner's conclusion that there was no 
"serious danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud.'mo The 
Supreme Court held that "an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, 
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to 
an agency's absolute discretion" under Section 701(a)(2) of the APA.271 
266. I33 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) ("When the Executive makes a principled determination that a 
statute is unconstitutional, it faces a difficult choice. Still, there is no suggestion here that it is 
appropriate for the Executive as a matter of course to challenge statutes in the judicial forum rather than 
making the case to Congress for their amendment or repeal. The integrity of the political process would 
be at risk if difficult constitutional issues were simply referred to the Court as a routine exercise.") 
267. The Court will appoint outside counsel to defend statutes when necessary, and of course, it 
usually receives a substantial number of amicus briefs on weighty issues of the day. 
268. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985). 
269. /d. at 823-24; see Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
270. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824-25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
271. /d. at 831. The Court presented four rationales for its decision. First, the decision involves a 
complex balancing of factors peculiarly within an agency's expertise, including whether a violation has 
occurred, whether agency resources are best spent on this violation, whether the enforcement proceed-
ing is likely to succeed, whether the action fits the agency's overall policies, and whether the agency 
has enough resources to undertake the action at all. /d. Second, by refusing to act, an agency "generally 
does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not 
infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect." /d. at 832. Third, agency inaction does 
not provide the same focus for judicial review as agency action. /d. And fourth, an agency's decision 
not to act "shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive 
Branch not to indict-a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive 
Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws 
2014] THE EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 395 
The presumption against review is not absolute, however. Two exceptions 
are relevant here. First, Congress can limit an agency's enforcement discretion 
"either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an 
agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.'m2 The 
Chaney Court contrasted the FDCA with the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)/73 which was considered in Dunlop v. 
Bachowski?74 The LMRDA provided that upon the filing of a complaint by a 
union member, "[t]he Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds 
probable cause to believe that a violation ... has occurred[,] he shall ... bring a 
civil action.'m5 Thus, if the statute clearly requires the agency to bring an 
enforcement action under certain specified conditions, the courts will enforce 
the congressional command. 276 
Second, the Executive cannot use its enforcement discretion to wholly abdi-
cate its responsibilities under the statute. As the Court explained in Chaney, the 
presumption against reviewability does not apply when the agency has "'con-
sciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount 
to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.'m7 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Brennan described this as "an agency engag[ing] in a pattern of nonen-
forcement of clear statutory language.'ms In Adams v. Richardson (the example 
cited by the Court in Chaney), African-American students, citizens, and taxpay-
ers alleged that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the 
Director of HEW's Office of Civil Rights "consciously and expressly adopted a 
general policy which is in effect an abdication of [HEW's] statutory duty" under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?79 The statute prohibits racial discrimi-
nation in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance280 and 
directs federal agencies to take appropriate action to effectuate the statutory 
prohibition,281 including by "cutting off the flow of federal funds ... or By any 
other means authorized by law.''282 In 1969-1970, HEW determined that ten 
Southern states were operating racially segregated systems of higher education 
in violation of Title VI and requested that the states submit desegregation 
plans?83 Five states totally ignored HEW's requests, and the other five sub-
be faithfully executed."' ld. at 831-32. The third and fourth rationales seem more relevant to ad hoc 
enforcement decisions than agency enforcement policies. 
272. ld. at 833. 
273. Id. at 833-35; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2006). 
274. 421 u.s. 560 (1975). 
275. 29 u.s.c. § 482(b). 
276. The enforcement provisions of the FDCA did not circumscribe the FDA's inherent discretion to 
decide which enforcement actions to pursue. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837. 
277. /d. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane)). 
278. !d. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
279. Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006). 
280. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d. 
281. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-l. 
282. Adams, 480 F.2d at 1161 n.l. 
283. /d. at 1164. 
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mitted desegregation plans that were unacceptable.284 But HEW took no ac-
tion?85 In addition, HEW failed to take enforcement actions against hundreds of 
other school districts that were out of compliance or to develop a program for 
enforcement with respect to vocational and special-needs schools?86 
Based on the Chaney framework, the DACA program would likely be un-
reviewable. First, though admittedly a stark example of implementing proposed 
legislation through enforcement discretion, it does not annul any statutory 
command directly and in whole. Put differently, there is no provision of the INA 
that specifically addresses the category of individuals eligible for deferred 
action under the DACA program. They are scattered among a variety of groups 
subject to deportation under the INA. Thus, the Obama Administration cannot 
be said to have abdicated its responsibilities under the INA, either as a whole or 
with respect to any particular provision?87 Notwithstanding the DACA pro-
gram, the Administration has deported an unprecedented number of undocu-
mented imrnigrants.288 Rather, the Administration has identified a category of 
individuals as low priorities for removal under the Act and allocated the 
Executive's resources elsewhere.289 Second, the INA has never been interpreted 
to command DHS to bring enforcement proceedings in every case of a violation 
of the Act or under conditions relevant to the DACA program?90 Thus, this is 
not a statute like the LMRDA in which Congress has limited the agency's 
enforcement discretion. 
Similarly, the George W. Bush Administration's policy (if it was an official 
policy) of eschewing pattern or practice race-discrimination lawsuits also would 
likely have been unreviewable. Although the Employment Litigation Section 
did not bring a pattern or practice lawsuit until Bush's second term, it did not 
completely avoid racial-discrimination lawsuits under Title VII. During George 
W. Bu.sh's first five years in office, the DOJ filed thirty-two complaints alleging 
violations of Title VII.291 Though the Bush DOJ enforced Title VII much less 
aggressively than the Clinton DOJ, which filed thirty-four complaints under 
284. /d. 
285. /d. 
286. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 95-98 (D.D.C. 1973). 
287. For a detailed analysis of what the INA commands, see David A. Martin, A Defense of 
Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach's Latest Crusade, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167, 170-83 (2012). 
288. Michael D. Shear, Seeing Citizenship Path Near, Activists Push Obama to Slow Deportations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,2013, atA12. 
289. Cf Adams, 356 F. Supp. at 95-98. Justice Scalia claimed in Arizona v. United States that "[t]he 
husbanding of scarce enforcement resources can hardly be the justification for this" due to the costs of 
suspending enforcement. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But surely it would take 
more resources to proceed with deportation than to review an immigrant's file (which must be done in 
either case) for purposes of DACA. 
290. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 ("A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials."); see Martin, supra note 287, at 170-83. · 
291. ClllZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 20, at 29. 
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Title VII during its first two years,292 it would be hard to describe this as an 
abdication of its responsibilities under the Act comparable to HEW's inaction 
under Title VI in Adams v. Richardson. 
In sum, the Court's presumption against the reviewability of enforcement 
decisions provides the President with a powerful extra-legislative veto to check 
statutory mandates he opposes so long as Congress has not spoken clearly and 
precisely in the language of command and the President does not completely 
abandon the enforcement of the statute. 
C. DECISIONS NOT TO IMPLEMENT A STATUTE THROUGH RULEMAKING 
Agency decisions not to implement a statutory mandate through rulemaking 
are subject to somewhat greater scrutiny than enforcement discretion. There is 
no presumption against the reviewability of agency decisions whether to engage 
in rulemaking.293 Thus, when several states, local governments, and environmen-
tal organizations sought review of the Bush EPA's denial of a rulemaking 
petition to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions, the Court reviewed the Agency's 
decision not to act.294 The Court identified two "key differences" between 
rulemaking and enforcement decisions. 295 First, rulemaking decisions are "less 
frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to 
special formalities, including a public explanation."296 Second, rulemaking 
decisions arise out of denials of petitions for rulemaking that the plaintiff 
generally has a right to file.Z97 Accordingly, they are subject to judicial review, 
although such review is "extremely limited" and "highly deferential."298 On the 
merits, the Court held that the EPA had jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse-gas 
292. !d. at 29. 
293. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). But see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 203 (1947) (absent statutory requirements, "the choice ... between proceeding by general rule or 
by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative 
agency"); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974) (same). 
294. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528. The Clean Air Act provides the reviewing court with authority 
to overturn any action that is "arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006). Although plaintiffs sought review of the EPA's denial under the Clean 
Air Act, the Court's analysis is equally applicable to suits under the APA, which includes the same 
language. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006). Although the EPA did not argue that Chaney applied to 
rulemaking decisions, perhaps feeling constrained by the D.C. Circuit's longstanding position that it did 
not, see Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the EPA contended that based 
on the same considerations, a "particularly deferential standard applies on judicial review of such a 
decision," Brief for the Federal Respondent at 37-39, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-ll20), 
2006 WL 3043970. Therefore, the EPA argued that even if it had jurisdiction, it had not exceeded its 
"considerable discretion" to deny rulemaking petitions. /d. at 36 (quoting Action for Children's 
Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458,479 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
295. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527. 
296. /d. (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n, 812 F.2d at 4). 
297. /d. 
298. /d. at 527-28 (quoting Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n of Am. v. United States, 883 
F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). The Court essentially adopted the position of the D.C. Circuit in 
American Horse Protection Association, 812 F.2d at 3-4. Though the four dissenting justices did not 
expressly endorse the majority's view of the reviewability question, neither did they voice any 
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emissions299 and that the EPA had abused its discretion by grounding its 
inaction in nonstatutory factors. 300 Thus, the Court exercised a check on the 
Bush Administration's extra-legislative veto. 
The Supreme Court's reasons for distinguishing between rulemaking and 
enforcement decisions are not entirely satisfactory. Although ad hoc enforce-
ment decisions may be more frequent, more likely to involve factual rather than 
legal issues, less formal, and unlikely to arise from the denial of a petition, the 
same cannot be said of enforcement policies like the one shielded from review 
in Chaney. The FDA's enforcement policy involved legal questions about the 
FDA's jurisdiction and the goals of the FDCA, it was well considered and 
subject to public explanation, and it arose from a petition for the FDA to take 
enforcement action.301 Yet enforcement policies are shielded from review just 
like ad hoc enforcement decisions. Moreover, some enforcement policies, such 
as the FDA's policy in Chaney and the DACA program, have far greater policy 
implications than many run-of-the-mill rulemaking proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court may have felt that this was a case in which 
Congress had given a clear statutory command that could not be skirted, akin to 
the way in which the LMRDA, cited in Chaney, detailed when the agency must 
bring an enforcement action?02 Thus, even a presumption like the one made in 
Chaney would not have saved the Bush EPA. This seems to be what the 
majority believed. The Clean Air Act provides that the EPA "shall by regulation 
prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from 
any ... new motor vehicles ... which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, 
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare."303 The Court interpreted this as a "clear statutory 
command" that the Administrator form a judgment about the danger of green-
house-gas emissions?04 
If the majority had been less convinced of the statute's clear statutory 
command, the Executive likely would have received significantly more leeway 
due to the deference the Supreme Court often grants agency interpretations 
of law.305 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, the 
Court held that courts must defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of the 
statutes they are charged with administering?06 Under Chevron, judicial review 
disagreement on this score. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 
549-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
299. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528. 
300. !d. at 534. 
301. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,823-24 (1985). 
302. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. 
303. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(l) (2006) (emphasis added). 
304. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
305. This was the argument made by the dissent. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 550 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) ("Where does the [Clean Air Act] say that the EPA Administrator is required to come to a 
decision on this question ... ?"). 
306. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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of agency interpretations involves a two-step process. First, the court must ask 
whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."307 If 
congressional intent is unambiguous, then the court must act as the faithful 
agent of Congress and give that intent its effect, approving consistent agency 
interpretations and rejecting inconsistent ones.308 But if the court determines 
that Congress has not directly addressed the precise interpretive question, then 
the court asks "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute."309 Scholars have come to view Chevron as a significant shift 
in the allocation of interpretative authority over regulatory statutes from judges 
to agencies? 10 
The interpretive question in Chevron was the meaning of a "stationary 
source" of air pollution as used in the Clean Air Act. 311 Following the election 
of President Ronald Reagan on a deregulatory platform, the EPA adopted a 
plant-wide definition of "source" in areas that did not meet National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards ("nonattainment areas")? 12 Consequently, a plant could 
install or modify a piece of equipment without meeting the permitting require-
ments of the Clean Air Act if the total emissions from the plant did not increase. 
Previously, the EPA had defined source to require a permit for the installation or 
modification of any single pollution-emitting device.313 The Court concluded 
that although Congress had sought to advance environmental objectives while 
allowing for reasonable economic growth,314 it had not reconciled these compet-
ing interests at the level of specificity required to choose among the different 
definitions of source.315 Consequently, the Reagan EPA was able to curtail the 
reach of the Clean Air Act by means of Chevron deference. 
In addition, during the 2012-2013 Term, the Supreme Court made it clear 
that the Chevron framework also applies to agency interpretations of their own 
statutory jurisdiction?16 Therefore, if the scope of an agency's statutory jurisdic-
tion is ambiguous, a court will defer to reasonable interpretations that expand or 
contract its power to act. 
Thus, if the Supreme Court had found the meaning of "air pollutant" in the 
Clean Air Act ambiguous, the Court might have found the Bush EPA's interpreta-
tion excluding greenhouse gases from the definition reasonable. In addition, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's command in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
307. !d. at 842. 
308. !d. at 842-43. 
309. ld. at 843. 
310. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the Executive's 
Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 146 & n.20 (2012) (collecting scholarship 
discussing the importance of Chevron to the shift in interpretive authority). 
311. 467 U.S. at 842. 
312. !d. at 848. 
313. ld. at 856. 
314. !d. at 863. 
315. /d. at 865. 
316. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2013). 
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Bush Administration managed to stall the EPA for nearly two years and kick the 
endangerment finding to the next administration? 17 Courts are generally reluc-
tant to compel agency action, using a multifactor test that considers, among 
other things, the effect of expediting delayed action on the agency's competing 
priorities.318 Consequently, as with enforcement discretion, the Executive can 
often point to other ways it is implementing an act to defend its inaction. 
Therefore, although decisions not to implement a statute through rulemaking 
are subject to judicial review and the agency must "ground its reasons for ... 
inaction in the statute,"319 Chevron deference and the reluctance of courts to 
compel agency action typically allow the Executive to retain substantial control 
over the timing, manner, and scope of statutory implementation, granting the 
President an important extra-legislative veto over statutory mandates he op-
poses.320 
*** 
In sum, judicial review permits some of the benefits of the extra-legislative 
veto, while checking more aggressive forms of executive lawmaking and 
excessive destabilization of government policy. When the Executive comes into 
direct conflict with a clear statutory mandate (for example, if Congress has 
specified the precise conditions requiring enforcement or promulgation of a 
rule), a court will act as the enacting coalition's faithful agent. But a court will 
permit extra-legislative vetoes of weak or nontransparent legislative bargains. 
Thus, the Executive may ease the rigor of the Clean Air Act's permitting 
scheme, but it may not eliminate the permitting requirements entirely; the 
Executive may decline to apply the INA to DREAMers, but it may not abandon 
all deportations under the INA; and the Executive may decline to defend 
DOMA, but a court may review a decision not to enforce it. 321 
The Supreme Court's approach safeguards us from the worst dangers of the 
extra-legislative veto, but it also limits the full potential of an executive check 
on legal mandates. The Court may have found the right way to balance the 
benefits and risks of the extra-legislative veto, but it may also be caught in 
something of a Catch-22. On the one hand, if the Court relaxes its constraints on 
317. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
318. See Sant' Ambrogio, supra note 14, at 1411-14 (discussing judicial review of agency delays); 
see also Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (setting forth a 
multifactor test for deciding whether to compel agency action unreasonably delayed). 
319. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,535 (2007). 
320. An interpretation weakening a statute may of course be based on a good-faith reading of the 
statutory text. My point is simply that interpretive deference is a tool presidents can use to weaken 
statutory mandates, not that all narrowing constructions are necessarily motivated by a desire to do so. 
Nevertheless, although it is theoretically possible for a president to carefully interpret a statute without 
regard to his policy agenda, it is hard to imagine. 
321. This assumes that a party has standing to challenge the Executive's nonenforcement. Cf 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661-62 (2013) (holding that proponents of a state constitu-
tional amendment approved by the voters of California did not have Article III standing to defend the 
measure in court when state executive officials declined to appeal an adverse judgment declaring the 
measure unconstitutional). 
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the extra-legislative veto, maximizing its power to protect the people from laws 
gone bad, the Court will transform the President into our Legislator in Chief. 322 
On the other hand, if the Court increases its scrutiny of extra-legislative vetoes, 
acting as the (overly) faithful agent of Congress and reducing enforcement and 
jurisdictional discretion, the Court will shrink the veto's potential benefits. 
Therefore, the next Part considers whether other institutional mechanisms might 
help to improve the regulation of the extra-legislative veto. 
IV. ENHANCING THE BENEFITS AND MITIGATING THE RISKS OF THE 
ExTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 
Judicial review acts as a check on executive lawmaking and policy instability 
threatened by enforcement discretion, but it does little to ensure the transpar-
ency of enforcement policies. 323 Conversely, judicial review of rulemaking does 
a better job promoting transparency but limits the President's power to protect 
the people from laws gone bad.324 This Part considers how various institutional 
mechanisms can improve extra-legislative vetoes exercised by means of enforce-
ment discretion and rulemaking. 
A. ENSURING THE TRANSPARENCY OF ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
The Supreme Court's presumption against the reviewability of enforcement 
decisions gives the President a powerful extra-legislative veto while preventing 
him from annulling whole statutes. 325 But it does little to ensure the transpar-
ency of government policy. If the President wishes to benefit a special interest at 
the expense of the public good, the Court's presumption makes this easy to 
do. 326 The Executive need not even admit that it is failing to defend the law 
because the Court does not require any justification for enforcement decisions 
unless the Executive completely abdicates its responsibilities under the stat-
ute. 327 There are several ways to improve transparency in this area. 
1. Reserving the Presumption Against Reviewability for Transparent 
Enforcement Policies 
The Supreme Court could encourage the transparency of enforcement poli-
cies by reserving the presumption against reviewability to policies that are 
publicly disclosed, perhaps through one of the mechanisms discussed below in 
322. Indeed, courts can do little to harness the full potential of the extra-legislative veto because 
allowing the President to annul duly enacted law is a nonstarter. 
323. See supra section III.B. 
324. See supra section III. C. 
325. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (the presumption against reviewability of 
enforcement decisions does not apply when the Executive wholly abdicates its responsibilities under 
the statute). 
326. See Bhagwat, supra note 260, at !57 (describing how enforcement discretion allows agencies 
to hide legislative and judicial judgments). 
327. 'see Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
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section IV.A.2. If the policy were formalized and transparent, a court would 
merely ask whether the Executive is abdicating its responsibilities under the 
statute. If the policy is neither formalized nor transparent but the challengers 
can show more than ad hoc decision making, a court would apply a more 
searching but still deferential review.328 Even if the Executive's policy would 
generally survive such review, judicial findings of fact would at least bring 
hidden policy changes to light. In addition, even deferential judicial review 
would provide some disincentive for the Executive to engage in stealth repeals 
that it does not want disclosed?29 
Unfortunately, litigation is a costly way to ensure transparency.330 Moreover, 
if the Executive did not survive review, a court might find itself in the un-
comfortable position of ordering the Executive to bring an enforcement action 
that is ultimately unsuccessful, wasting more resources, even if the Executive 
had not abandoned enforcement of the statute?31 In addition, it is easy for the 
Executive to drag its feet on enforcement actions it opposes. 332 Therefore, 
courts are not institutionally well equipped to police the transparency of enforce-
ment policies. 
2. Precommitting the Executive Branch to "Best Practices" 
The Executive Branch is the source of extra-legislative vetoes and is there-
fore in the best position to regulate their use. But ad hoc self-regulation depends 
on the political incentives of the moment. Therefore, the Executive should 
precommit itself to using certain "best practices" in implementing enforcement 
policies. 
The Obama Administration's implementation of the DACA program en-
hanced the attributes and minimized the risks of the extra-legislative veto. First, 
as with any policies owned by the President, it was highly transparent.333 To the 
extent that the President takes responsibility for enforcement decisions and 
memorializes new policies in the public record, the extra-legislative veto will 
avoid the problem of stealth repeals and increased congressional monitoring 
costs. In addition, transparency makes both public and congressional delibera-
tion possible, although not inevitable. The policy decision was extensively 
covered in the press and has become the subject of legal and policy debates. 334 
Although Congress did not immediately take up the issue of immigration 
328. This could be a deferential form of arbitrary and capricious review. 
329. By definition, stealth repeals have political costs if they are disclosed to the general public. See 
supra section II.C.2.a. 
330. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 1989 DuKE L.J. 522,536-37 (1989). 
331. Cf Sant'Ambrogio, supra note 14, at 1411-14 (discussing the difficulty· courts have with 
compelling agency action). 
332. Cf Sant'Ambrogio, supra note 14, at 1412 & n.l71 (noting that courts routinely decline to 
compel agencies to act even when they have dragged their feet for years). 
333. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
334. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
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reform/35 public and electoral approval of the extra-legislative veto did ulti-
mately put the DREAM Act back on Congress's agenda.336 
An executive order could precommit the Executive Branch to transparency 
through the use of formal policy memoranda, such as the one Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued in connection with the announce-
ment of the DACA program.337 Furthermore, an executive order might require 
agencies to submit proposed enforcement policies, like proposed rulemakings, 
to the White House and Congress in advance of their implementation.338 This 
could also be done with agency jurisdictional decisions if they are not already 
part of a formal rulemaking proceeding. Such transparency would avoid stealth 
repeals, lower congressional monitoring costs, and give Congress the opportu-
nity to deliberate on changes in government policy before they are imple-
mented. 
In addition, an executive order should require formal enforcement discretion 
policies to be time limited and periodically reviewed to ensure that they 
continue to be appropriate ways of enforcing the statute. This would accomplish 
two things. First, it would lend legitimacy to the President's actions by showing 
that the Executive is not permanently rewriting the law. Second, it would 
provide Congress with a record to help determine whether further legislative 
action is appropriate. Indeed, the Executive should send Congress a report on 
the policy's successes and failures at the end of the review process. Though 
these procedures may, like litigation, incur some costs,339 they are likely to be 
much less than those of litigation and represent investments in improved 
policymaking dialogue. 
This does not mean that enforcement policies should necessarily be subject to 
formal notice-and-comment rulemaking. Although there are informational advan-
tages to notice-and-comment procedures, they also involve substantial time and 
effort.34° Consequently, requiring rulemaking to set enforcement policies might 
discourage agencies from adapting their enforcement policies to a changing 
335. After all, the Democratic Senate leadership had urged the President to exercise his enforcement 
discretion after Republicans blocked the DREAM Act. 
336. In 2010, a Gallup poll found that 54% of Americans supported giving legal status to illegal 
immigrants who came to this country as children if they joined the military or went to college. Paul 
Steinhauser, Poll: 54 Percent Support DREAM Act, CNN (Dec. 10, 2010), http://politica1ticker.blogs. 
cnn.com/2010/12/10/poll-54-percent-support-dream-act/. President Obama's decision to shield the 
DREAMers from the INA is widely viewed as contributing to his electoral victory in 2012. 
337. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 122. 
338. Cf Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 646-48 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) 
(directing agencies to submit proposed ru1emaking to the White House Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs for advance review). 
339. Cf PETER M. SHANE, MADISON's NIGHTMARE: How ExECUTIVE PowER THREJJENS AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 168 (2009) (assessing the costs of OIRA review of agency rulemaking). 
340. See Letter from Jacob E. Gersen, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., & Anne 
Joseph O'Connell, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law, to Jessica Hertz, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 
(Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp!EO/fedRegReview/ Anne_Joseph_ 
OConnell. pdf (finding that significant rulemaking proceedings between 1995 and 2008 took 503.4 days 
and that even routine rulemaking proceedings during the period took 385.3 days). 
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environment or encourage them to conceal such adjustments.341 Moreover, it is 
difficult to draw a line between ad hoc enforcement decisions and a broader 
enforcement policy. 
In sum, executive precommitment to such procedures would help ensure that 
enforcement policies are politically responsive and protect the people from poor 
applications of the law, while still engaging Congress in interbranch delibera-
tion and creating opportunities for policy experimentation. 
3. Enhancing Transparency Through Framework Statutes 
Congress could also enhance the transparency of enforcement policies by 
means of framework statutes. For example, Congress could amend the APA to 
require the Executive to state enforcement policies in writing, explain their 
goals and rationales, limit their scope and duration, and provide a mechanism 
for periodic review. This would not ultimately require the Executive to change 
its policy without further legislative action, but like the National Environmental 
Policy Act, which requires all government agencies to prepare Environmental 
Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements,342 it would provide a basis 
for further policy deliberation. In addition, it would help the current Congress 
assess whether the Executive is exercising its enforcement discretion consistent 
with Congress's view of the law's most important objectives. 
Of course, Congress has the power to draft statutes that circumscribe the 
Executive's enforcement discretion ex ante.343 But negotiating and drafting 
legislation at a high level of detail would be costly and reduce the flexibility 
needed by the Executive in a complex and dynamic postindustrial society. In 
most cases, it is better for Congress to allow the Executive to address unfore-
seen circumstances as they arise. 
B. GRANTING THE EXECUTIVE JURISDICTIONAL DISCRETION 
The reconceptualization of the extra-legislative veto in Part II provides 
additional support for the Supreme Court's recent decision clarifying that 
agencies may obtain Chevron deference for interpretations of their statutory 
341. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE 
L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992) (arguing that the ossification of rulemaking encourages agencies to engage in 
"alternative, less participatory regulatory vehicles"). But see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and 
Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1414, 1421-22 (2012) (concluding based on empirical 
analysis that ossification is neither a serious nor widespread problem). 
342. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (requiring federal 
agencies to prepare a statement discussing: "(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible 
and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it 
be implemented"). 
343. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction just like other forms of statutory interpretation.344 Consequently, it 
is now clear that the Executive may expand and contract its jurisdiction where 
Congress has not clearly defined its boundaries.345 Granting the Executive 
Branch such jurisdictional discretion will achieve some of the benefits of an 
extra-legislative veto, allowing the President to protect the people from poor 
applications of the law and to protect himself from conflicts with his political 
constituency. In addition, so long as agencies define their statutory jurisdiction 
in response to petitions for action, 346 changes in the jurisdiction that they claim 
or disclaim should be transparent.347 This transparency will in tum enhance the 
deliberation-forcing effects of the changes, allowing Congress and the public to 
debate the appropriate scope of the agency's jurisdiction. If Congress disagrees 
with the Executive's interpretation, Congress can, with sufficient political consen-
sus, amend the law to expand or contract the agency's jurisdiction. 348 
Moreover, if courts provide the Executive with room for reasonable inter-
pretations of ambiguous grants of authority, the Executive will have less 
motivation to make strained or disingenuous arguments to justify its action or 
inaction.349 Finally, the jurisdictional discretion granted to the Executive exists 
within statutory constraints, inasmuch as there are limits to how much expan-
sion or contraction of agency jurisdiction the text of the statute will bear?50 
Thus, executive lawmaking and policy fluctuations will be restrained by the 
current legislative text and subject to additional restraint if Congress disagrees 
with the Executive's interpretation and takes further legislative action. 
Of course, the refusal of the Bush Administration to regulate greenhouse-gas 
emissions suggests that the White House may continue to .stall agency action 
even when the Supreme Court has held that the agency not only has jurisdiction 
344. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013). Of course, agencies are not always 
entitled to Chevron deference for their statutory interpretations. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218,237 (2000) (holding that Chevron deference is only appropriate for agency interpretations 
of their organic statutes when Congress delegates to the agency power to make rules with the force of 
law and the agency's interpretation of the statute is promulgated pursuant to that authority); Christensen 
v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (withholding Chevron deference for informal interpretations 
of statutes). But see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (granting Chevron deference given 
"the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the 
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful 
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time"). 
345. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874-75. 
346. See, e.g., id. at 1867, 1874 (agency interpreted its jurisdiction in response to a petition for 
rulemaking); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510-11 (2007) (same); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 832-33 (1985) (agency interpreted its jurisdiction in response to a petition for enforcement 
action). 
347. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text. 
348. See supra notes 302-10 and accompanying text. 
349. Cf Watts, supra note 195, at 42 (arguing that crediting political reasons for agency decisions 
would encourage agencies to disclose political factors in rulemaking rather than "hiding behind 
technocratic fa~ades"). 
350. See supra notes 307--{)9 and accompanying text. 
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but is statutorily compelled to act.351 Would it be better to simply broaden the 
presumption against the reviewability of enforcement decisions to include all 
agency decisions over whether to exercise jurisdiction? In other words, an 
agency's decision not to engage in rulemaking would be presumptively unreview-
able unless plaintiffs could show that the statute constrained the Executive's 
discretion to act, as the Court seemed to believe the Clean Air Act did in 
Massachusetts v. EPA;352 that the Executive based its decision not to act on an 
erroneous interpretation of its jurisdiction; that the Executive was abdicating its 
responsibilities under the statute; or that the Executive's inaction raised constitu-
tional concerns?53 
Although this approach would undoubtedly save significant time and money 
spent litigating agencies' regulatory jurisdiction, for several reasons, it does 
not seem worth the benefits. First, in most cases, the Executive is unlikely to 
drag its feet to quite the same extent as the Bush Administration did with 
the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions. The human contribution to climate 
change is a highly salient and politically controversial issue. It is not terribly 
surprising that the Bush Administration tried to block the regulation of green-
house-gas emissions to avoid a conflict with an important political constitu-
ency-in this case, the oil industry.354 But the White House is unlikely to have 
the time or will to exert such effort with respect to a wide range of issues. 355 
Second, despite White House obstruction, the Bush EPA did manage to issue 
an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and obtain additional public com-
ments and information on the contributions of greenhouse gases to global 
climate change?56 Thus, although the EPA moved slowly, it moved. Because of 
the complexity of many regulatory issues, it is better for civil-service profession-
als within the regulatory agencies to continue to analyze regulatory problems 
than to simply ignore them, even if the agency ultimately delays taking action. 
The next administration will benefit from this work if it decides to proceed with 
regulation in the area. 
Third, many statutes have no practical effect until implemented through 
rulemaking. Rulemaking often gives meaning to the statute passed by Congress 
and the parties that will be subject to its commands. 357 Thus, unlike instances 
when an agency decides not to bring an enforcement action, when an agency 
351. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
352. See supra notes 302--04 and accompanying text. 
353. For discussion of Heckler v. Chaney, see supra notes 271-86 and accompanying text. 
354. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn & Robin Bravender, EPA Releases Bush-Era Endangerment 
Document, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.cornlgwire/2009/l0/l3113greenwire-epa-
releases-bush-era-endangerment-document-47439.html (reporting that the Bush Administration re-
treated from a proposed endangerment finding concerning greenhouse-gas emissions after pressure 
from, among others, the oil industry). 
355. See Eshbaugh-Soha, supra note 50, at 266. 
356. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
357. See CROLEY, supra note 194, at 116 (noting that Congress's regulatory legislation typically 
increases, rather than decreases, agencies' regulatory authority). 
2014] THE ExTRA-LEGISLATIVE VETO 407 
decides not to engage in rulemaking, there may be no legal command with the 
force of law defining the legal standards to which parties must conform their 
conduct. If the Executive's discretion to exercise its jurisdiction were limited 
only by abdication of its statutory responsibilities, significant gaps would re-
main in what the law requires. 
In sum, providing agencies with discretion to exercise their jurisdiction when 
the statute is ambiguous permits some of the benefits of the extra-legislative 
veto while providing a judicial check on excessive executive lawmaking and 
policy instability. But presumptively shielding agency decisions not to exercise 
their jurisdiction, particularly through rulemaking, would permit much greater 
executive lawmaking and hinder the ability of future administrations to change 
regulatory directions. 
V. THE STRONG PRESIDENTIAL NONENFORCEMENT THEORY 
President Obama's decision not to defend DOMA reinvigorated and deepened 
an important debate about whether the President should enforce laws he be-
lieves are unconstitutionae58 Most recently, Professors Delahunty, Devins, 
Prakash, and Yoo have articulated a provocative presidential nonenforcement 
theory, arguing that the President has a constitutional duty not to enforce laws 
he believes are unconstitutional. 359 The presidential nonenforcement theory is 
based on the premise that (1) the President has his own constitutional vision and 
(2) the President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend"360 the Constitution 
and the Take Care Clause command the President to enforce the Constitution 
when he believes it conflicts with a federal statute.361 Accordingly, the President 
should not enforce laws he believes are unconstitutional unless and until the 
Judiciary holds that the law is constitutional.362 Even then, under the strong 
version of the theory, the President should only abide by judicial judgments in 
the case at bar. 363 
Rather than engage in the interpretive debate over the constitutionality of 
nonenforcement, which has been the focus of the literature to date, this Part 
offers an assessment of presidential nonenforcement as an extra-legislative veto 
using the framework developed in Part II. It concludes that although nonenforce-
ment possesses many of the benefits of other extra-legislative vetoes, it is less 
effective at promoting congressional deliberation over controversial policies, 
while running the risk of excessive executive lawmaking and policy destabiliza-
tion. 
Presidential nonenforcement would dramatically increase the President's power 
358. For a collection of the literature, see supra note 24. 
359. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 798-803; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 509. 
360. U.S. CoNsT. art. II,§ I, cl. 8. 
361. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 798-803; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 532-33. 
362. Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 574--76. 
363. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 798-803; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 574--76. 
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to protect the people from laws that the President views as unconstitutional and 
to protect himself from conflicts with his political constituency created by the 
dead hand of past enacting coalitions.364 Because the Executive must inform 
Congress of its decision not to enforce a statute, nonenforcement would also be 
transparent. Thus, it has the potential to encourage public deliberation regarding 
policies that may be unconstitutional. For example, if the Obama Administra-
tion had decided not to enforce DOMA in addition to not defending the law, the 
President would have shielded same-sex couples married under state law from 
DOMA's negative impact, solidified the President's standing with an important 
political constituency, and furthered public deliberation of the law's constitution-
ality. 
But presidential nonenforcement would likely not have the same congressio-
nal deliberation-forcing benefits as other extra-legislative vetoes. Nor would it 
ensure a high level of political support for contested policies. For those laws the 
President ignores based on constitutional objections, Congress will find it 
difficult to respond. If Congress passes new legislation, the President can veto 
it. If Congress overrides the President's veto, the President can, based on the 
nonenforcement theory, continue to disregard Congress based on his constitu-
tional vision. Congress must await judicial resolution of the matter, and even 
then, according to the strong version of the theory, the President must do no 
more than abide by judgments in individual cases?65 Moreover, the Executive's 
decision not to enforce a statute will bar judicial review if no party has standing 
to challenge the law. 366 In these cases, it may be more akin to an absolute rather 
than a limited veto power. Consequently, Congress has little to deliberate, and 
even the unanimous support of Congress for the policy will be unavailing. 
In addition, the Supreme Court might ultimately disagree with the President's 
constitutional vision, impeding a robust interbranch dialogue. Although the 
President can recommit himself to legislative repeal, the procedural roadblocks 
will remain, and the Court's pronouncement will undoubtedly undermine the 
President's constitutional and legislative positions. Just as the threat of a court 
striking down a statute as unconstitutional can force legislative action, 367 
judicial approval is likely to impede legislative action. Furthermore, if the 
364. Presidents already decline to enforce laws that intrude on executive power, and this part of their 
theory is not particularly controversial. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 798-803; Devins & 
Prakash, supra note 24, at 546 & n.196, 560--61; Meltzer, supra note 24, at 1199-1201. 
365. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 798-803; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 574-76. 
Devins and Prakash acknowledge that the President need not persist in nonenforcement if it becomes 
futile in light of consistent judicial disagreement. Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 57 4-76. 
366. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 571-72 & n.302; May, supra note 8, at 992-95; see 
also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (shielding from appellate review a judicial 
order declaring a state law unconstitutional because state executive officials did not appeal the 
decision). 
367. DADT, for example, was repealed against the background of judicial holdings that it was 
unconstitutional. John Schwartz, Ban on Gays in the Military Stays in Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2010, atAIO. 
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Executive refuses to enforce the law, there is little incentive for further legisla-
tive action, other than a congressional expression of displeasure. The only direct 
check on Executive non-enforcement available to Congress is impeachment, but 
this is so politically costly as to be inappropriate for all but the most egregious 
Executive decisions not to enforce the law.368 
Of course, Congress can respond to the Executive's veto indirectly, even if it 
cannot override nonenforcement directly. Indeed, because of the difficulty of 
legislative action, Congress (or components thereof) often expresses its displea-
sure indirectly. For example, Congress may withhold funds from other presiden-
tial priorities, block the confirmation of presidential nominees, or frustrate the 
President's legislative agenda more generally.369 But such collateral attacks are 
less-than-ideal ways of furthering an open and vigorous interbranch dialogue 
over the President's constitutional views and are likely to have negative conse-
quences for unrelated policies and personnel. 370 
At the same time, presidential nonenforcement may not achieve the full 
potential of other extra-legislative vetoes as a check on bad laws. The nonenforce-
ment theory limits the Executive's veto to laws the President disapproves for 
constitutional reasons; he may not decline to enforce laws based on policy or 
political reasons. 371 It shares this characteristic with presidential decisions not 
to defend laws. By contrast, extra-legislative vetoes exercised by means of 
enforcement discretion or statutory interpretation do not simply implement the 
President's constitutional vision; like the contemporary use of the Article I veto, 
they also protect the people from policies the President deems unwise based on 
his unique national perspective. Of course, this limit on the scope of presidential 
nonenforcement may be a virtue or a vice, depending on one's perspective. 
368. u.s. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-4. 
369. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2702, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("Congress ... has innumerable means (up to and including impeachment) of compelling the President 
to enforce the laws it has written .... Nothing says 'enforce the Act' quite like ' ... or you will have 
money for little else."'). 
370. Alternatively, some scholars argue that Congress should have standing to sue the Executive to 
compel it to enforce the law. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressio-
nal Standing Can Solve the Enforce-But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FoRDHAM L. REV. 577, 582 (2012); see 
also Frost, supra note 107, at 919 (proposing that Congress "take a more active role in federal 
litigation, both to provide the courts with the legislative perspective on interpretive questions and to 
counter executive influence"). A full discussion of the doctrinal viability and normative desirability of 
legislative standing is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in United 
States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court dodged the question of whether the House of Representatives had 
standing to intervene in the case as a party to defend DOMA. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013). Put simply, 
it is not clear whether Congress has standing to defend a general law the Executive does not enforce, let 
alone compel the Executive to enforce such a law. Moreover, even if Congress were to have standing to 
defend federal laws in court (or is permitted to present arguments as an amicus party), Congress cannot 
itself override the President's nonenforcement. Rather, Congress can merely ask a court to do so. Thus, 
Presidential nonenforcement is not a limited extra-legislative veto like enforcement or jurisdictional 
discretion, in which Congress may directly override the President. 
371. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 24, at 798-803; Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 532-33; 
Yoo, supra note 125. 
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Advocates of presidential nonenforcement argue that it will not dramatically 
increase the President's power vis-a-vis Congress because the President has a 
limited constitutional agenda?72 But it is also important to recognize that this 
same constraint may limit the value of presidential nonenforcement. Alterna-
tively, the constitutional-reason requirement may not limit the veto's reach at all 
but merely prompt the President to look for constitutional justifications to 
implement his policy preferences.373 But this is even more problematic because 
it motivates the President to be disingenuous about his reasons for nonenforce-
ment/74 undermining the extra-legislative veto's transparency and deliberation-
forcing benefits. 
Presidential nonenforcement not only fails to achieve the full deliberation-
forcing benefits of other extra-legislative vetoes, but it also entails additional 
risks. The unilateral nature of nonenforcement and the power of the President to 
ignore any constitutionally objectionable provision of a statute create the risk of 
excessive executive lawmaking. The President acting alone could repeal a law 
or rewrite it to remove any provision he finds constitutionally objectionable. If 
no party has standing to challenge the nonenforcement, there will be no direct 
check on the President's extra-legislative veto. Thus, nonenforcement may be 
akin to the line-item veto that the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in 
Clinton v. City of New York, 375 at least within its constitutional domain. 
Moreover, each new presidential administration could revisit the law's consti-
tutionality. If Mitt Romney had been elected President in 2012, for example, he 
might have refused to enforce the individual mandate of Obamacare on the 
grounds that it was unconstitutional, upsetting the reliance interests built around 
this component of the law, such as the prohibition on excluding coverage for 
preexisting conditions and the elimination of lifetime caps on benefits. 376 And a 
subsequent Democratic administration might have changed course once again. 
Thus, unilateral nonenforcement may exacerbate ongoing fluctuations in govern-
ment policy. 
Of course, in some cases such policy changes may be no more dramatic in 
scope than those implemented by means of enforcement discretion. The number 
of immigrants impacted by the DACA program is far greater than the number of 
military personnel that would have been impacted by President Clinton's nonen-
forcement of the law excluding HIV-positive individuals from serving in the 
military (if the law had not been repealed)?77 But in the case of enforcement 
372. See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 24, at 556-57. 
373. This is the concern expressed by Professors Kerr and Meltzer. See Kerr, supra note 92; Meltzer, 
supra note 24, at 1229. In the case of DOMA, however, its nonenforcement could easily be defended 
based on the President's independent constitutional vision. 
374. Cf Watts, supra note 195, at 42. 
375. 524 u.s. 417,448-49 (1998). 
376. See Key Features of the Affordable Care Act by Year, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcarelfacts/timelineltimeline-text.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
377. HIV-positive military personnel number in the hundreds, Matthew M. Burke, No Postings Yet 
for HIV-Positive Marines, Sailors Since Policy Change, STARS & STRIPES (May 23, 2013), http://www. 
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discretion, there are legislative and judicial checks on the Executive. Congress 
may respond to the President's enforcement discretion by reducing or elimi-
nating such discretion with new legislation imposing greater policy stability. 
The Judiciary will enforce these limits. By contrast, Congress has no direct 
legislative response available to it under the strong presidential nonenforcement 
theory, and the judicial check will depend on whether a party has standing to 
challenge the Executive's nonenforcement. 
In sum, presidential nonenforcement is a problematic extra-legislative veto. 
Although it dramatically increases the President's power to protect us from laws 
that the President sees as unconstitutional, it also increases the President's 
lawmaking power vis-a-vis Congress. At the same time, it would neither reach 
all laws gone bad nor be likely to facilitate robust deliberation between the 
political branches over controversial policies-a core function of the extra-
legislative veto. At best (assuming a party has standing to challenge nonenforce-
ment), presidential nonenforcement creates a dialogue between the Executive 
and the Judiciary-a dialogue in which the Supreme Court has the final word. 
Congress in most cases would be relegated to attacking other presidential 
policies to express its displeasure or submitting its constitutional arguments to 
the courts. 
This is not to say that presidents should always enforce laws they deem 
unconstitutional. But the framework developed herein suggests that presidents 
should have particularly compelling reasons to not enforce such laws, particu-
larly where Article III standing doctrines may preclude any type of judicial 
check on their nonenforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The extra-legislative veto plays an important role in our Madisonian system. 
It allows the Executive to shield the people from oppressive laws; to adapt 
policies to individual cases and broad social, political, and economic change; to 
protect the President from conflicts with his political constituency created by the 
dead hand of past political coalitions; and to promote deliberation regarding 
controversial policies. In this way, it has helped our Madisonian system adapt to 
increasing congressional gridlock in our deeply partisan age. So long as institu-
tional constraints on the extra-legislative veto ensure its transparency, enhance 
policymaking dialogue between the political branches, and preserve Congress's 
supremacy in lawmaking, we should welcome the Executive's ability to protect 
the people from laws gone bad. 
stripes.com/news/us/no-postings-yet-for-hiv-positive-marines-sailors-since-policy-change-1.222048, 
whereas immigrants eligible for deferred action under DACA number in the hundreds of thousands, see 
Preston, supra note 122. 

